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 Abstract: This research project assesses and analyses the extent of Genuine Normative 
Intent, - Process and - Impact of the European Union (EU) through the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in the Post Soviet States of Moldova and Ukraine.  The this 
research reflects on the ENP, the foreign policy tool of the EU. The theoretical foundation 
of research is based on the theory of Normative Power Europe (NPE) as theorised by Ian 
Manners, Arne Niemann and Tessa de Wekker.  NPE is based on the norms promoted by 
the EU. The methodological approach to this research is a three-level theoretical 
framework of analysis: Genuine Normative -Intent, -Process, and -Impact. Besides the 
NPE, two traditional and positivist International Relations theories; Neo-liberalism and 
Neo-realism, provide a basis for a critical reflection on the empirical cases of Moldova 
and Ukraine. In the project it is concluded that the ENP has Normative Intent, -Process 
and -Impact, while it lacks genuineness in Intent and Process due to inconsistencies and 
double standards in the ENP programme. It is concluded that Normative Power Europe is 
a comprehensive explanation for EU external action through the ENP. 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
The first chapter of this project will present a Research Field framing the foreign policy of the 
EU and the theoretical and practical problems associated with addressing this. The Problem 
Area is focused on exploring the area of ENP, enlargement and accession within the EU 
foreign policy which leads to the Research Question, followed by a section defining the core 
concepts of the project report at the end of the chapter. 
 
 1.1 Research Field 
“The success of [the European countries’] effort to consolidate themselves into the 
European Union will determine their future influence. United, Europe will continue as a 
Great Power; divided into national states, it will slide into secondary status.” (Henry 
Kissinger 1994). 
 
There is a new sheriff in town. This could very well be a phrase that crossed the minds of the 
European leaders, when the Lisbon Treaty finally became a reality early December 2009. As a 
result of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union (EU) could finally 
introduce a face, which represents it outwardly on the international arena, with the nomination 
of Catherine Ashton as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy. 
This appointment was made after a long period time with disagreement in Europe about 
foreign policy matters. At the beginning of the Iraq-war in 2003, the EU split into two camps; 
one supporting the US military intervention in Iraq, and one against. Most recently the 
Russian military intervention in Georgia of August 2008 emphasised the same problem, when 
the EU Member States collectively was ambiguous in their reaction and position on the 
Russian military actions. Former United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has in the 
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past pointed out this paradox quite clearly, when he asked: “Who do I call if I want to talk to 
Europe?” This exemplifies the weakness of the EU, when it comes to outwardly be united 
and speak with one voice. 
However, the EU has always been a difficult actor to analyse, and the question of its role in 
the international arena has been even more difficult to understand, not only for those outside, 
but also for the Member States themselves. The EU is often described as a case of Sui Generis 
because the relationship between the Member States and the Union institutions does not fit 
into the concepts and framework of traditional ideas of International Relations theory. Neo-
realism for instance cannot explain why states would give up sovereignty and it has 
difficulties explaining why the EU does not at present have military capacity. 
The international world order of the twenty first century is unprecedented in many ways. 
Europe was before that for hundreds of years synonymous with conflict and clashing national 
interests in the three eras; the Peace of Westphalia, the Congress of Vienna, and the Cold War. 
We see today a world order in which the common acknowledgement of the concept raison 
d‟état1 makes the former conflicting national interests obscure. Thus the conflict of interests 
between sovereign countries, post Cold War is limited to local or regional interest spheres. 
 
 1.2 Problem Area 
The 2004 enlargement of the EU, where ten new Member States were accessed into the EU, 
actualised one of the biggest challenges in recent European history; how to handle the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc, and the reunification of Western 
and Eastern Europe. The approach to handle this situation was given a more ideational form 
rather than the traditional material and physical. The former Communist countries were 
offered assistance to economical and political development as part of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) or for the most developed, the prospect of membership 
                                                          
1 raison d’état - The concept of national interest. A nation‟s goals and ambitions and how it pursues these are 
central in the field of International Relations 
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negotiations and later accession to the EU. In return the EU expected continued democratic 
and economic reforms towards the ideas and concepts of the EU and the acquis 
communautaire
2
. After the 2004 enlargement of the EU, cooperation with Eastern European 
countries was moved into the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Focus was changed from EU accession into a more traditional bilateral cooperation between 
the EU and the partner countries based on common interests instead of direct membership 
talks. “The objective of the ENP is to share the benefits of the EU‟s 2004 enlargement with 
neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned” 
(Consilium.europa.eu 2004: 3) – This new framework of the ENP was developed because of 
an enlargement fatigue. This was more precisely demonstrated with the French and Dutch 
“no‟” to the Lisbon Treaty referendum in 2005. The reason to that could very well be that 
European integration was conceived as happening too rapidly and out of touch with the EU 
citizens.  
There are different ways among scholars of how to research and interpret the ENP; new 
colonialism, a tool of cultural expansion, or a security policy tool. In recent years however, 
focus among scholars has moved to approaching the ENP as a normative policy tool. In the 
context of this project it will be established how the EU as a normative power and the ENP as 
a normative foreign policy tool can be explained theoretically. This notion is very important 
because the framework of the ENP relies heavily on normative justification and soft power 
tools rather than brute force and hard power. One of the leading scholars in the field of 
Normative Power Theory, Ian Manners, states that the use of normative power in world 
politics implies a different form of engagement than the traditional International Relations 
theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. The focus suggested by Manners relies on the 
actual policies of the combined EU rather than on the political relations and possible gains 
between Member States or how a state‟s foreign policy is connected with its domestic ditto.  
These normative power foreign policy tools have been applied considerably in Eastern 
Europe, which importance was further stressed with the set up of the Eastern Partnership in 
                                                          
2    acquis communautaire -  The accumulated legislation, legal acts, court decisions which constitute the body 
of European Union law 
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late 2009. Often the Eastern European countries are somewhat split between EU aspirations 
and their relationship with Russia. Ukraine and Moldova are archetypal examples of this 
„conflict of interest‟, and will therefore be studied through a case-study analysis. This paradox 
of what seems like the coexistence of contradicting foreign policies of the EU and Russia in 
Moldova and Ukraine will be analysed.  It is of great of importance in order to avoid the 
stigmatising relations between EU and Russia in the Cold War era. 
 
1.3 Research Question 
To what extent does the EU‟s European Neighbourhood Policy have genuine normative Intent, 
Process and Impact in the former soviet space of Ukraine and Moldova? 
 
Elaborated research question 
The foreign policy of Ukraine and Moldova is changing towards a more EU focused 
approach. Can the genuineness of normative Intent, Process and Impact of ENP be validated 
and thus explain this change, or is it a result of actions based on neo-liberalism and neo-
realism?  
  
Sub-questions 
1 To what extent is the ENP normatively genuine? 
2 Is the ENP creating conflicts of interest with Russian foreign policy in Ukraine and 
Moldova? 
3 Can ENP also be explained by neo-realism or neo-liberalism? 
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 1.4 Definitions 
It is necessary to define and clarify the context of the research question in order to define the 
extent of the research itself. This will be done in the following section. 
In this project report the EU will be applied in analyzing its international actions as a common 
entity. Thereby the EU is understood as a single actor, operating through the European 
Commission. 
The genuineness of the EU‟s external actions is central in the analysis. Genuineness is 
understood as to have the meaning of being what it appears to be and not something different: 
That normative action is in fact normative and not based on internal interest. Furthermore, 
legitimacy will be applied when a positive evaluation of coherence and consistency of EU 
external action is found.     
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is defined as a foreign policy tool of the 
European Union, concerning 16 of its neighbouring countries. The ENP was established in 
2004, which also sets the timeframe of the analysis. 
The definition of normative in this project shall be understood as directing specified norms to 
constitutive the political structure and political cohesion. Thus to act normatively is to 
encourage change in political activity and outcomes that ought to occur, because these 
outcomes are the best suited for prosperity and stability. 
Ian Manners identifies Normative Power Europe (NPE) in five core norms that are embedded 
in the EU law and policies (Manners 2002). These five norms are: peace, liberty, democracy, 
the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Manners furthermore mention four additional 
norms that are found in the acquis communautaire; social solidarity, anti-discrimination, 
sustainable development, and good governance (the 5+4 norms). The above mentioned norms 
have been the focus of the EU‟s foreign policy in the Post Cold-War period. NPE portrays the 
European Union as a foreign policy actor that achieves its goals refraining from the 
application of hard military power and promotes universal values by peaceful means of 
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influence. These norms are incorporated in the framework of the ENP, which is characterized 
by the application of normative power. 
The former soviet space encompasses the geopolitical area of the former republics of the 
Soviet Union. Historically both Moldova and Ukraine have been politically dominated by the 
Soviet Union, and are still an important part of Russian foreign policy interest. 
Intent represents the goal and intentions of the foreign policy of the ENP. The Process is 
defined as the actions whereby the ENP is applied by the Union. The Impact is the spread of 
norms of the EU in Moldova and Ukraine. Therefore, in the context of this project report, 
Impact will be applied to define the development of norms in Moldova and Ukraine, whether 
the political institutional norms are changed by the ENP. 
 
 1.5 Project Design 
In the following text there is an explanation of how the pieces of this project fits together with 
the problem formulation.  
The introduction in chapter 1 ties a normative standard to EU foreign policy and the EU's self-
understanding of it. Additionally it also funnels down the scope of the project, from a general 
perspective on EU foreign policy to a focus on the normative Intent, Process and Impact of 
the ENP in regards to Moldova and Ukraine. This leads to a methodical examination of 
scientific pitfalls and substantiated choice of empirical and theoretical frame in chapter 2. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the theoretical background for the problem formulation, and is split into 
three parts; an exploration of how to research norms in foreign policy based on the works of 
Ian Manners with associated critiques and counterarguments, a theoretical discussion of EU 
foreign policy from a Neo-realist, a Neo-liberal and a Normative Power Europe view, and a 
theoretical framework, which explores the three levels of normative analysis in depth, namely 
Normative Intent, - Process and - Impact, in order to explain the genuineness of ENP. Chapter 
4 provides the background for further discussion of the genuineness of Intent, Process and 
Impact of the ENP. Within this chapter there is first a verification the EU norms presented by 
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Ian Manners. Different approaches to how these norms are spread by the EU, then an analysis 
of EU foreign policy in terms of ENP. How these norms have created a rivalry with Russia in 
Ukraine and Moldova is described in chapter 5. In chapter 6 the analysis assess the 
genuineness of Normative Intent, -Process and -Impact of the EU in the case countries of 
Moldova and Ukraine. And, in chapter 7, there is a reflection on the two other previously 
scrutinised theoretical explanations; Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism. This is added in order to 
validate the explanation power of the main theory, Normative Power Europe. A conclusion of 
the findings of this project report is established in chapter 8. In chapter 9, a quality validation 
of the project‟s conclusions is provided. Finally, in chapter 10, a general perspective of the 
project‟s findings is given.   
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 2. Methodology 
 
In the following chapter there is an additional explanatory text to the Research Question 
stating the practical reflections on how we approach and delimit our research method. Next, 
the science theory will be established and reflected on, and furthermore a substantiation of the 
choice of theories, cases and central concept is explained. 
The theoretical background of this project report is based on three theories on international 
relations; Normative Power Europe, Neo-liberalism and Neo-realism. Normative Power 
Europe is the theoretical perspective in this project report, while the other two theories are 
more positivist theories in international relations' critically applied, enabling a theoretical 
triangulation. It is considered possible that other IR theories would enable a more in depth 
analysis and theoretical explanation for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
There are three main science theoretical pitfalls associated with this project that can 
compromise a proper scientific approach: 
The first pitfall is regarding how to handle norms, and has previously been examined in Søren 
Midtgaard‟s interpretation of Max Weber in his papers on the relativity of values (Midtgaard 
2010: 382). The main argument made by Midtgaard that needs to be reflected on in this 
project is whether is and should need to be separated in the scientific analysis. Midtgaard 
argues that it is necessary to keep the empirical separate from the what the scientist feel is the 
best, a sentiment that builds on the logic that a normative argument cannot be substantiated, as 
what is viewed as good by one person is not necessary good by the definition of someone else 
(Midtgaard 2010: 384). This, however, creates a problem when analysing normative theory as 
presented by Ian Manners, who define a method to identify norms as being normatively good. 
Identifying a norm as being good raises a problem, when applying a Weberian frame of 
science theory. Charles Taylor on the other hand has a critique of Weber and an answer to this 
problem that correspond to Manners frame of reference. According to Midtgaard's 
interpretation of Taylor it is possible for a norm to be normatively good if it is coherent with 
other norms that are generally accepted as good (Midtgaard 2010: 385). In this frame 
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normative arguments can be used if they are coherent with the majority of the society, and the 
more coherent a set of values that a norm is based on, the better an argument the norm is. 
But Manners does not change the status of separating is and should as he still base his work 
on examining whether the norms that the EU proclaim to have, actually is norms for the EU. 
There is, however, one place where it would be prudent to raise a critique of whether Manners 
has been able to separate his own opinion of what a good norm is with his goal of claiming 
that the norms of the EU is 'good' by a standard of universalism: Manners has identified nine 
primary norms of the EU, which he consequently addresses as being good because of their 
universal nature and because they are ratified as good by the United Nations and therefore by 
most countries in the world (Manners 2008a, Manners 2008b). 
The second pitfall is a matter of methodical consistency in regards to the status of an actor‟s 
actions. The EU can be understood as both an actor with its own agenda and as an actor with 
multitude agendas. The problem is that although it might be able to determine that within the 
field of the ENP it is possible to say that the EU is normative, it is, however, difficult to 
generalise the conclusions on all EU policy areas. To avoid this methodical obstacle the scope 
of the project will be limited to the ENP, while disregarding other aspects of the EU. 
The third pitfall is the problem of researchers being part of what they research. This is 
especially true for this project because we are Europeans who investigate European values. 
According to the philosophical hermeneutic by Hans-Georg Gadamer the investigator in a 
scientific paper risks becoming a part of the hypothesis testing apparatus itself (Højberg 2004: 
320). In order to address this we need to make sure that our arguments are logically sound and 
that someone, who does not share our set of values, would reach the same conclusion. A way 
for us to do this is by critical self reflection on the conclusions and arguments of this project, 
which we will obtain by having a quality evaluation at the end of the analysis. Another way of 
enhancing the credibility of this project is by using sources and material that constitute a wide 
selection of both critical and source documents thus creating a triangulation. 
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2.1 Methodological Considerations on Sources 
This project will answer the problem formulation mainly by applying theoretical analysis, 
empirical analysis and analysis of other secondary sources. Thus the focus of this project is a 
qualitative analysis. The problem formulation will be answered through the applications of 
theory to an analysis of reports, law, speeches and articles and the theoretical framework will 
be elaborated deductively, moving from theory to analysis and hypothesis testing. This project 
will be using three different theory frames in order to analyse and answer the problem 
formulation and to maintain a critical perspective to the research field of this project. The 
frames used are: Neo-liberalism, Neo-realism and Normative Power Theory. Neo-liberalism 
and Neo-realism will be used for the purpose of reflecting on whether normative impact could 
be explained by either theory. 
Both empirical and theoretical articles such as the case studies on Moldova and Ukraine serve 
as basis of the analysis. Normative Power Europe will be applied as a theory based on the 
three dimensional spectrum from Nieman and de Wekker; Normative Intent, Normative 
Process, and Normative Impact. This three dimensional division also serves as a division of 
the project. The normative intent of the EU will be described through looking at the EU itself 
and what norms it has and which norms Ian Manners has identified as being embedded in the 
EU as the 5+4 norms: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, 
social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance. It will 
be discussed whether or not these values are a consistent part of the foreign policy and the 
ENP with regards to Moldova and Ukraine and then if they are also coherent with the actions 
of the EU. 
When looking at the empirical material, the 5+4 norms of the EU will be identified through 
primary and secondary sources. The primary source include Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
and the Lisbon Treaty article excerpts as well as transcripts of speeches by commissioners of 
the External Relations and ENP,  speeches from official representatives of Ukraine and 
Moldova. The speeches will be important for our analysis in order to determine the impact of 
Normative Power Europe and identify the 5+4 norms in the case study. 
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Furthermore as secondary sources this project will be using the theoretical literature on the 
EU and Normative Power Europe as explained primarily by Ian Manners, Arne Niemann and 
Tessa de Wekker. The theory of Ian Manners will serve as the main theoretical framework of 
the project, while the article by Niemann and de Wekker will be used as an theoretical 
determiner of three indicators of Normative Power Europe (intent, process and impact). 
Articles by Helene Sjursen, Adrian Hyde-Price and Thomas Diez are induced in order to gain 
a more reflexively approach to the understanding of theoretical frame of the project. 
 
 2.4 Delimitation 
This part will specify what has been excluded from the project report. This will enable a 
clarification of important areas attached to the problem area, which, nonetheless, must be seen 
as being outside the scope of this project. 
 
European Parliament foreign affairs such as resolutions on the case countries will not be 
analysed. Military aspects of foreign policy in general will be excluded. North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) related issues will, as well, not be included. The Eastern Partnership 
initiative will be excluded because it would divert our focus away from the case studies of 
Moldova and Ukraine. The European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), which is the 
financial mechanism that backs up and implements the Action Plans, is also excluded. 
Therefore budgetary measures engaging in cooperation and development of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy partner countries will be excluded. Thus, the project report will be 
limited to assess the broad and general intent, process and impact of ENP. The Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well as the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) will not be analyzed either, as these policy areas are of intergovernmental nature 
centred around military power and other traditional hard power measures. Russia will be 
considered in the light of the ENP, but its foreign policy will not be discussed in detail, only 
where it is applicable in the analysis of Moldova and Ukraine. 
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 3. Theoretical Framework 
 
As this project is looking at the conundrum of how the EU can shape and influence 
international relations even though it has no military power to speak of and is at times lacking 
internal coherence in a time of international crisis. First, in this chapter the ideas of Normative 
Power Europe (NPE) will be outlined as explored by Ian Manners, which will also work as 
the theoretical approach to the problem area of this project report. In order to get a broader 
understanding of the theoretical field of NPE there will also be an introduction to normative 
Intent, Process and Impact as explored by Arne Niemann and Tessa de Wekker. Next will 
follow an introduction to the two grand theoretical approaches in the field of international 
relations namely neo-realism and neo-liberalism. This introduction will involve into a more 
general discussion on the differences between the grand theories and NPE. 
 
 3.1 Theoretical Field for Normative Power Europe 
When it comes to EU and the theoretical discussion of power, there has been a debate on non-
military power since the early 1970‟s. Francois Dûchene described Europe as a civilian or 
civilizing power focussing on cooperation, non-governmental actors and economic incentive 
rather than as a military power (Dûchene 1972). Dûchene has called the civilian power an 
idee force,
3
 thus describing it as something qualitatively different than using threats or 
incentives, be they economic or military (Dûchene 1973). Dûchene had a notion of a 
collective Europe, which has led to the idea of Europe as a superpower, a notion sharply 
critizised by Hedley Bull saying that “‟Europe' is not an actor in international affairs, and 
does not seem likely to become one…"(Bull 1982: 151). 
                                                          
3
 idee force - the power over opinion 
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Twenty years later in 2002 Ian Manners rephrased the term 'Civilian Power Europe' into 
'Normative Power Europe (NPE)' (Manners 2002). Manners views normative power as 
something distinguishably different from military or economic power and non-reducible to 
these. Manners characterize Normative as the 'Ability to shape conceptions of normal' 
(Manners 2002: 240) 
The concept NPE used by Manners refers to not only the fact that the EU can achieve goals 
without military power, but also that the goals of the EU are normatively anchored in a 
Kantian philosophy
4
. The EU has both norms it wishes to promote and a normative way of 
achieving it. According to Manners, the EU is special because it not only wants to promote 
norms, but also promotes the norms via a normative process. 
Thomas Diez has criticized Manners for his focus on the EU, when it comes to promoting 
universal norms by peaceful means such as political attraction (Diez 2005). Diez argues that 
the foreign policy of the EU resembles that of the US before World War I, and is therefore not 
a case of sui generis. Diez criticises the concept of NPE, arguing that it is already included 
within the frame of Civilian Power Europe, and that the 'normative' element is an EU 
discourse made to create a distinct European identity. Diez explains the US development from 
a normative power to a military and economic power, by arguing that the increasing military 
capabilities of the US as well as an increased international pressure for the US to step up and 
be a military power were both main factors in its transformation into a superpower. Diez 
argues that the same tendencies can be seen in the EU, where there is both an internal and an 
external pressure to develop military capabilities.  
Manners has answered Diez, by defending the EU as a special case as well as elaborating on 
the qualitative difference between Civilian Power Europe and NPE (Manners 2006). Manners 
argues that the EU is special because of the extent to which it commits itself to the norms that 
it promotes, while the US might promote norms, but it does not commit itself to them. Given 
                                                          
4 Manners does not himself use the phrase Kantian philosophy, but he refers to the norms of the EU as having 
the quality of being universally accepted as 'good'. 
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the historical context of Europe in the world
5
, it seeks to build non-hierarchical relationships. 
Manners claims that it is the cosmopolitan values of the EU norms and the 'ordinariness' of 
the EU that has created a humility to the way that the EU promotes its values that makes it 
unique. This should be seen in contrast to the self perception of the 'exceptionalness' of the 
US (Manners 2006). As to the difference between civilian and normative power, the argument 
goes that there are six differences between the two concepts (Manners 2006:175): 
1. There is a discursive difference between the words normative and civilising. The word 
civilising has a negative connotation to colonialism, while normative power is an 
attempt to avoid civilising missions by countering the neo-colonial discourses of 
claims implicit or explicit in civilian power. 
2. The focus on non-military and economic means in civilian power forgoes 'imitation' 
and 'attraction' as valid modes of power gain. 
3. That civilian power is communitarian, and mainly concerns itself with the benefits for 
those that exercise it, while normative power is universal/cosmopolitan and to the 
benefit of all. 
4. That civilian power adheres to a Westphalian concept of international politics, whereas 
normative power transcends nation states and focus on global politics. 
5. Civilian Power has reduced power to interaction between agents, while Normative 
Power also addresses how actors interact. 
6. Lastly, Manners addresses the quality of 'good' and 'ought to' in Normative Power by 
pointing out how Civilian Power lacks these qualities. Civilian Power is not in itself a 
power of good. Economic and non-military coercion could easily be used for self-
interest within a Westphalian culture. 
 
                                                          
5 Namely imperialism, world wars, holocaust, colonialism and inequality 
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Manners reply to Diez critique of Normative Power as being a discursive identity by the EU. 
It is not the EU as a normative actor that creates an identity but rather the multiple identities 
of Europe that has created a multiple number of contradicting norms expressed by the EU 
(Manners 2010). 
The resemblance between the US and the EU by Diez is mirrored by Helene Sjursen, who 
argues that “US foreign policy is at least as normatively driven and infused by moral 
argumentation as the EU”(Sjursen 2006:171). She also argues that at the desire for the EU to 
gain military power, questions whether it is a Normative Power. Sjursen requests a framework 
for analysing Normative Power. She contributes to this by asking three questions (Sjursen 
2006:170): 
1. What would be the criteria for identifying a 'normative/civilian/civilizing' power?  
2. How can we theoretically account for the putative existence of the EU as such a 
power? 
3. Does the argument that the EU is a 'normative/civilian/civilizing' power hold up to 
systematic empirical investigation? 
Sjursens argument for having a better analytical framework is tied to her observations on how 
and when the EU acts. According to Sjursen, the EU acts from a 'logic of appropriateness' as 
described by James G. March and Johan Olsen, meaning that the EU will act on behalf of 
what it sees as its own identity (March and Olsen 2004). 
Although Sjursen is critical towards the idea of Normative Power, and calls the very concept a 
contradiction in terms because it defies the normal definition of power, “which is to make 
others do what they would otherwise not do” (Sjursen 2006:172), were power is a matter of 
incentive and coercion while normative is a matter of legitimacy. 
Manners responds to the critique raised by Sjursen in two articles (Manners 2008a, Manners 
2008b). In the first article he identifies nine norms (5+4) that are formulated by the EU in the 
treaty text: sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social 
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solidarity, sustainable development and good governance (Manners 2008a). While in the other 
article he creates a framework for how to analyse whether a political entity is acting 
normatively. Manners does this by first creating three levels of empirical analysis; principles, 
actions and impact and then he identifies three normatively sound maxims, by which the EU 
conducts its foreign policy: live by example, be reasonable and do least harm (Manners 
2008b). 
The explanatory power of 'Normative Power Europe' by Manners is also challenged by the 
Adrian Hyde-Price, who has given a neorealist explanation of the phenomenon that Manners 
call a Normative Europe (Hyde-Price 2006). Hyde-Price adopts the neo-realist concepts 
coined by Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer and Edward Carr (Hyde Price 2006, Jackson and 
Sørensen 2007) to argue that the EU is still ruled by the three big states; France, Germany and 
Britain, and gives a frame to discuss how the EU foreign policy functions in a neo-realist 
power perspective. Hyde-Price claims that great powers has a limited number of options in 
the international system and that the actions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) falls within the categories of 
balancing, buck-passing or band-wagoning. Meaning that the EU either balance itself against 
the existing Superpower USA, by supporting either Russia or China, or lets the US deal with 
shared security threats (such as the Middle East), while the EU focuses on expanding its 
economy, or that the EU will try to align itself with the strongest actor in the system, and gain 
influence by agreeing to policies made by the US. By claiming that the EU does not act as it 
does from a normative sense of universal good, but to gain a better position within the 
international power system, Hyde-Price refute Manners theory altogether. 
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To summarise there are four main critiques of Ian Manners Normative Power Europe concept. 
Author Thomas Diez Helene Sjursen 
and Thomas Diez 
Helene Sjursen Adrian Hyde-
Price 
Critique It is too hard to 
distinguish 
normative power 
from civilian 
power. 
EU is not the 
only actor that 
uses normative 
argumentation. 
Normative power 
lacks an 
unequivocal 
method of 
analysis. 
EU foreign 
policy can just as 
easily be 
explained by 
power politics. 
 
To add our own critique, we would like to pull the promotion of liberal market economics 
away from its current position as part of the 'Four Freedoms' (free movement of people, 
goods, services and capital) of the EU (Manners 2008a, 2008b) and instead claim it to be a 
central principle of the EU, hence we see a correlation between the 5+4 norms and the liberal 
market economy, which build on.   
From the above theory field for Normative Power Europe it is necessary to make a few 
remarks on where to go from here. The arguments made by Sjursen create an analytical frame 
and would be somewhat easy to embed and can be researched empirically once it has become 
operational to our focus of the project (Sjursen 2006): 
1. What would be the criteria for identifying a 'normative/civilian/civilizing' power?  
2. How can we theoretically account for the putative existence of the EU as such a 
power? 
3. Does the argument that the EU is a 'normative/civilian/civilizing' power hold up to 
systematic empirical investigation? 
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Manners himself identify both the norms of the EU as well as criteria for when these norms 
can be called normative both by their universalism and a criteria for how the promotion of the 
norms can be normative. 
Secondly Manners has the historical argument concerning the feeling of guilt and bloody past 
of Europe as a reason for why the EU exist as a normative power at all, while realists argue 
that the current policy of the EU has emerged as a result of the lack of European military 
capability during the cold war (Hyde Price 2006 and Sjursen 2006). 
The scholars Arne Niemann and Tessa de Wekker have addressed the third point in Sjursen‟s 
research framework: “Does the argument that the EU is a 'normative/civilian/civilizing' power 
hold up to systematic empirical investigation?”(Sjursen 2006:170). This project builds its 
analysis on the research frame by Niemann and de Wekker in later part. 
 
 3.2 Three Approaches to International Relations 
As we aim not to only verify the existence of a normative power relation between the EU and 
Ukraine and Moldova, but also seek to critically reflect on whether any explanatory power by 
using Normative Power theory could not as well be explained by other theories within 
international relations, we need to include a basis for how and when these theories can be 
discussed. We have chosen to include the neo-realist and neo-liberalist approaches as these 
theories are mentioned by authors critical to normative power, as being able to either 
substitute a normative power explanation or in the case of Neo-liberalism, that Normative 
Power are already covered within its theoretical framework. 
No matter how much faith one has in the EU and its role in the international system, it cannot 
be denied that the EU is an untraditional actor and participant in the field of International 
Relations, and when tested, the EU fails, at times, to act as a single actor. The focus point of 
many critiques on the EU is therefore mainly centred on the lack of unity and therefore the 
lack of relative power. Realist theories have some very clear cut explanations for this by 
drawing on experience from the Cold War era, where it was the dominant theoretical approach 
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to explaining how and why states interact. It delineates International Relations as a struggle 
for power amongst states that pursues one goal, and that is survival (Jackson and Sørensen 
2007). Realism follows the basic assumption that states acts independent in an anarchic 
system that consists of rational unitary states. Realism was the most dominant International 
Relations theory during the Cold War because it provided a simple but powerful explanation 
of war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation, etc., and the fact that it gave an 
confident answer to the main problem at the time; the Soviet/American relationship (ibid.). 
Realism has evolved as a theory through times. Classical realism, inspired by Hans 
Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, believes that states act as human beings and as such have 
a natural desire to dominate each other. This also explains why war happens. This idea was 
later modified by Kenneth Waltz with his view on „Structural Realism‟, or as it has been more 
commonly known, Neo-realism. Neo-realism ignores the idea of human nature as important 
for how a state acts, and instead brings focus on the international system. The assumption is 
that the international system consists of great powers and weak states each trying to survive in 
a system where there is no central authority to protect them from each other. In the end, this 
will lead the weaker states to balance against, rather than bandwagon with the more powerful 
states (ibid.). 
Neo-liberalism is contrary to realism, a more idealistic way to theorise international relations. 
Neo-liberalism is often seen as a challenge to Realism, and focuses mainly on the idea that 
economic interdependence between states will discourage them from using force against each 
other. This is a concept, which has been widely explored by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. 
Nye. Keohane and Nye define interdependence as situations characterized by reciprocal 
effects among states or among actors in different states. Interdependence exists and occurs 
where there are reciprocal costly effects of international transactions, such as flows of money, 
goods, people and information (Keohane and Nye 2001). These four freedoms does 
resemblance the 5+4 norms projected by Ian Manners in his Normative Power Europe. 
However, Interdependence does not mean mutual benefit, and relationships involve costs that 
cannot be specified a priori. Unlike in military security politics, the resources that produce 
power capabilities have become more complex. Instead power is the ability of an actor to get 
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others to do something they otherwise would not do, and be conceived as the control over 
outcomes (ibid.).  
The hard versus soft power classification, was forged by Joseph Nye. He divides power into 
two categories, where hard power is usually identified with military power, and soft power 
with civilian power (Laïdi 2008). Off course military power can also be combined with 
civilian power and vice versa, which is mostly effective, when one power lends credibility to 
the other. This is particularly in the case of US versus European power. Although both are 
equal in economical terms, the US enjoys a much larger political status in the international 
system, because of the fact that its military capabilities outweigh the ones of Europe (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, the European incapacity in military- and hard power should not be seen only as a 
disadvantage, which Zaki Laïdi also reflects on, when trying to distinguish between hard and 
soft power: “a hard power is an actor capable of resorting not only to force but also to 
coercion, whereas a soft power is an actor capable of reducing and convincing other actors to 
accept its own preferences. A hard power inspires fear, whereas a soft power uses attraction 
instead of fear.” (Laïdi 2008: 19). The foreign policy approach of the EU should therefore be 
more focused on convincing and attraction, considering its lack of abilities to use force or 
coercion. 
This project has, until now shed light on areas of varying global and theoretical relevance. 
The project has a research area that allows it to process the term 'Normative Power' in a 
theoretical context, as both part of and as opposition to theories on international relations 
emphasizing on the importance of hard power in neo-realist theories (Mearsheimer, 
Morghentau, Waltz et al.) as well as the normative argumentation of neo-liberalism and 
complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 2001). Within the framework of this project it is 
examined how well the EU‟s external action tool of ENP is working to promote EU practices 
and norms in an area that traditionally has been within the Russian influence sphere. The ENP 
is often described as one of the most explicit examples of normative power; this research will 
determine the impact of the 5+4 norms in an environment where the norms are exposed. 
Research on normative power rivalry has relevance for a theoretical critique of neo-realist 
theories, in the sense that the EU as an actor has increased its normative adherence in Eastern 
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Europe, without using hard power instruments. This  suggest that the premises of Neo-realism 
is not correct or that Normative Power is building on a transformed power instrument, such as 
economic incentive and that adherence to the 5+4 norms only stretch as far as it is to the 
benefit of the receiving country. This leads to questioning the limits of EU latitude in the 
eastern neighbourhood with its current external policy, and subsequently answering a question 
of how ENP can have more impact. In short, research on the eastern ENP in association with 
Normative Power Europe, are important in order to understand the EU foreign policy. 
 
 3.3 Comparison of International Relations Theories 
As a contrast to both Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism there is the concept of Normative 
Power Europe that has been reinvented by Ian Manners as a way of describing how and why 
the EU acts as it does in the international arena. Manners have rekindled a debate on the 
normative side of the EU's international behaviour and capabilities as a response to the 
traditional focus on military and civilian power. Manners thus describe the EU's role and 
identity in the international society as being a normative power: 
“I argue that by refocusing away from debate over either civilian or military power, it is 
possible to think of the ideational impact of the EU's international identity/role as 
representing normative power.”(Manners 2002: 238) 
By presenting a third power into this discussion Manners has gotten beyond the problem of 
trying to apply theories on state behaviour and state capabilities to a foreign policy actor such 
as the EU. The nature of the third (normative) power Manners describe as: 
“...the notion of a normative power Europe is located in a discussion of the 'power over 
opinion', Idée force or 'ideological power', and the desire to move beyond the debate over 
state-like features through an understanding of the EU's international identity” (Manner 
2002:239). 
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Furthermore, Manners distinguishes between civilian and military power compared to 
normative power by describing military and civilian power as focused on the capabilities of 
those particular forces, while normative power is an ability to shape ideas: 
“What I am suggesting here is that conceptions of the EU as either a civilian power or 
military power, both located in discussions of capabilities, needs to be augmented with a focus 
on normative power of an ideational nature characterized by common principles and a 
willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions. This is not to say that the EU's civilian 
power or fledgling military power, are unimportant, simply that its ability to shape 
conceptions of 'normal' in international relations need to be given much greater attention.” 
(Manners 2002:239) 
In the above quote Manners also presents an additional ability to the concept normative 
power. A way to interpret Manners concept of Normative Power Europe is by describing it as 
'power over opinion', Idée force or 'ideological power” (Manners 2002: 239), while the 
outcome of these powers are 'the ability to define what passes for normal” (Manners 2002: 
240)  
It could however be discussed if normative power also should include a power of practice
6
 or 
an institutionalizing power in order to further explain how the EU can effectively export 
values and practices to states that are not initially adhering to the 5+4 norms, but gradually 
will do so as EU practices are institutionalized.  
According to Manners, EU norms are diffused in international relations in the following way: 
Contagion is exemplified in copying regional integration, as for example Mercosur in South 
America (Manners 2002: 245). Informational diffusion happens through new policy initiatives 
and various strategic communications, e.g.: from the President of the European Commission. 
There is moreover, procedural diffusion, which constitutes institutionalising relationships, i.e. 
membership accession, between third parties and the European Union. Transference diffusion 
                                                          
6  This concept can also be used to describe the spreading of British norms to its colonies by practice 
and civilian presence, rather than US spreading of norms by changing constitutions and creating new 
governments. 
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occurs through financial means or trade to third parties, and overt diffusion is caused by the 
direct presence in third party states, e.g.: monitoring. The last factor of diffusion is the cultural 
filter, “which affects the impact of international norms and political learning in third states 
and organizations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms” (Manners 2002: 
245).  In relation to the enlargement, this means that there is a process in which an acceding 
country undergoes EU norm diffusion. 
In a debate between Manners and Diez the difference between normative and civilian power 
are brought forth. According to Manners Normative Power Europe builds on a cosmopolitan 
view of humanity, while civilian power, and thereby neo-liberalism, is building on a 
communitarian view (Manners 2006). In order to make a methodical distinction between 
these two, we need a theoretical background for the two normative angles; Cosmopolitanism 
and Communitarianism. The first approach focuses on the individual or humanity as a whole 
and it is based on universal morality. Cosmopolitanism disregards the notion of the state and 
accepts the emergence of economic interdependence and international organizations, where 
the state is constrained and decreases in significance both in moral and practical ways 
(Fiendberg 1996: 1). 
Communitarianism focuses on a political community, or localities, which then in turn 
formulate the actions of individuals; hence the individual is embedded in the social context, of 
the locality, or state, they are in (Fiendberg 1996: 1). Communitarians strive to preserve the 
values embedded within the community, as it is believed that these would be degraded by 
generalisation. A state is accepted by Communitarians, if it acts as a community and serves to 
accommodate individuals within it. Thus, as Feindberg states, it is understood as 
representation of the community (Brown Fiendberg 1996: 1). Thus, Cosmopolitanism 
emphasizes the individual and is more idealist, the state being simply a connection of 
individuals, whereas, Communitarianism is founded on a realist account, where the world is 
made up of an “anarchic system of independent states” (Fiendberg 1996: 1). 
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 3.4 Normative Intent, Process and Impact 
When looking at empirical works on Normative Power, it is important to have some 
theoretical tools to measure whether or not Normative Power can be found and proved as 
having importance for the field of study. Therefore it is necessary to identify some indicators, 
which can recognise, observe and measure Normative Power Europe in the research. A good 
example of such indicators has been formulated by Arne Niemann and Tesa de Wekker in 
their article “Normative Power Europe? EU relations with Moldova”. In this article they 
identify three levels that are important for an operationalisation of Normative Power; (1) 
normative Intent: the seriousness/genuineness of normative commitment; (2) normative 
Process: the extent to which an inclusive and reflexive foreign policy is pursued; (3) 
normative Impact: the development of norms in third countries (Niemann and de Wekker 
2010: 7). The cohesion between these three levels is by Niemann and de Wekker described as: 
Basically, „normative power Europe‟ is characterised through normative intentions on the 
part of the EU and dealing with partner countries through normative means (process). To 
make normative power complete „the ability to define what is normal‟ needs to be assessed in 
terms of the impact that the EU makes on the norm development in third countries (ibid).  
 
 3.4.1 Normative Intent: How is the EU a Genuine Normative Actor? 
Normative Intent is a question of whether the norms EU are trying to promote acts as if they 
are pursued by a self-interested agenda, or can be described as genuine norms that can be 
broadly accepted, and identified as acting for good. Niemann and de Wekker does not seek to 
cultivate a simple dichotomy of „norms versus interests‟, but argues that in a broader process 
norms and interests tends to go together (Diez in Niemann and de Wekker, 2010). Norms and 
interests therefore often run in parallel, meaning that the norms the EU are trying to promote 
also reflects its interests.  
To link this to significant empirical findings, Niemann and de Wekker mention four indicators 
that can be taken into consideration in order to determine the normative Intent of the EU. First 
it is important to decide, whether the norms act as the centre of relations with the third 
countries, or if they are peripheral to the EU‟s engagement. How are the planned agreements 
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between the EU and the third country? If the agreements are focused around the norms, it 
reflects genuine normative concern by the EU. If not it is more likely that the relation is based 
upon a more self-interested background, and therefore less genuine. 
Secondly it is important to determine whether the projected norms can be seen as hurting or 
serving EU interests. The more the norm conflicts with EU self-interests the more relevance it 
has, and the more genuine the EU acts, according to Normative Power Europe. 
As a third indicator, it should be determined if the EU acts and communicates consistently or 
to which degree it uses double standards, when engaging in relations with third countries 
(Sjursen and Checkel in Niemann and de Wekker, 2010). According to Niemann and de 
Wekker Consistency is applied and can be explored on different levels: a) Does the EU apply 
the same standards that it asks of a certain third country internally? b) Does the EU apply the 
same standards for different third countries? c) Are the EU‟s words followed by deeds, i.e. are 
its declared (normative) objectives in line with its foreign policy action? (Niemann and de 
Wekker 2010: 8).   
As a fourth and final indicator we find coherence. In contrast to consistency, coherence must 
be seen as the connectedness of claims and actions through shared principles (ibid.). The 
dividing line between consistency and coherence is whether the standards of the EU are lower 
than the standards it demands of a third country and thereby create a double standard that 
cannot be justified it constitute a major incoherence and therefore is not genuine. 
  
 3.4.2 Normative Process: How can the Norms be Legitimised? 
The idea of normative Process is important to determine if the EU really is a force for good 
and not just trying to promote its own ideals upon the third countries. To comply with this the 
EU needs to be open towards external input, criticism and reflection about the possible impact 
of its actions. According to Normative Power Europe the norms have to be normatively 
justifiable, meaning it must not just reflect the ideas of the EU, but also ideas outside the EU. 
The EU risks acting in a Eurocentric manner if it does not promote universal approved norms, 
i.e. norms put forward by the UN system. 
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 3.4.3 Normative Impact: To What Extent can the EU Shape what is Normal? 
The significance of emphasising the implications of the EU‟s actions is as important as 
analysing the Intent and Process (Tocci in Niemann and de Wekker, 2010). The level of 
normative Impact can more or less be described as the normative power of the EU, and 
therefore also a way of analysing how effective the EU has been acting. In order to determine 
that if the EU is acting effective, it is important to ask whether or not normative change 
towards the 5+4 norms has been taken in the third countries. However, it is necessary to 
emphasise that normative change can only be approximated. This means that the best way to 
measure normative impact is to look at the degree to which the norms projected by the EU are 
being adapted by the political environment and the media discourse of the third country. If 
norms become a part of the discourse it can be seen as a sign of norm adoption 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier in Niemann and de Wekker, 2010). “One possibility of 
tracking (the degree of) internalisation is to analyse the extent to which political actors make 
consistent use of a norm” (Niemann and de Wekker, 2010: 11). This can be investigated by 
looking at speeches by representatives of the third countries. If there is a clear adaption of the 
norms promoted by the EU in the speeches, it can be argued that normative impact has 
occurred. 
Another way to measure normative Impact is by looking at to what extent the legalisation of 
the third country has been amended on background of the norms projected by the EU. The 
level of impact, however, may be limited by the fact that some political institutional reforms 
have been adopted merely to fulfil a certain conditionality inducted by the EU. 
These three indicators of Normative Power Europe; Intent, Process and Impact, will in the 
scope of this project be the basis for the analysis on the case reports, where the third country 
notion will be replaced by Moldova and Ukraine. Furthermore it is important to notice that the 
focus point of this project is to identify the Intent, Process and Impact of in Ukraine and 
Moldova, therefore making these indicators a more central part of our analytical framework.  
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 4. Background Information on EU Norms, EU Foreign Policy and ENP 
 
In the following chapter this project will focus the gathering facts and background knowledge 
for the analysis. First there will be a focus on the general norms of the EU and how the EU 
spreads these norms. Then there is a description of EU foreign policy, the ENP and its relation 
to EU enlargement.  
 
 4.1 The Norms of the EU 
The question now is: “what is it that the EU wishes to pass as normal?” A good way to 
answer this is to look at what is written already in the EU treaty base on how the EU shall act 
in international politics: 
“Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation […] and which it seeks to advance in the wider world; democracy, 
the rule of law , the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the 
principles of the United Nations Charter and international law” (TEU 2008: art.21(1)).  
Article 21 of the TEU does not only supply the EU with a number of norms, but also a 
reference to the international community and gives the EU a mission to promote these norms. 
By the wording of the article EU has clearly put itself to be subject to international law, while 
at the same time wanting to be able to shape these laws.  
In addition to the EU's external policy as formulated by article 21(1), the 1993 Copenhagen 
Criteria for joining the EU are also a good indicator for EU norms as mentioned in the part 
about enlargement. 
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 4.1.1 How is the EU spreading its norms? 
The 5+4 norms are spread in various ways. The EU seeks both to empower the UN, use 
economic incentives as well as methods of best practice and the empowerment of regimes in 
the international community. 
By the wording of article 21(1) the EU has put itself to be subject to international law, which 
gives both the EU's own external policy as well as the UN increasing legitimacy. At the same 
time the EU are very prominent in the field of creating multilateral institutions that are by 
themselves often promoting the 5+4 norms.  
A good example of one such institution is the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 
ECHR is founded by the EU but gives the task to give rulings based on the UN Charter of 
Human Rights. This setting shows that the EU has a willingness to set up international 
institutions, even outside its own control, in order to give legitimacy and promote core values. 
Another way for the EU to expand its norms is by simple enlargement. The Scholar Jan 
Steinkohl gives a good description of the mechanics behind enlargement policies based on a 
quote of EU Commissioner Olli Rehn: 
“The aim of enlargement is simple: to extend the area of peace, stability, democracy and the 
rule of law, and prosperity and wellbeing throughout Europe [...] This shows yet again that 
the Union is a value driven actor, trying to spread its core norms of peace and conflict 
prevention, the rule of law and multilateralism, liberty, democracy and human rights. It seeks 
to reform the international system at large, ideally making the system more like itself. In sum, 
the European Union can be described as an increasingly proactive normative power.” 
(Steinkohl 2010: 10).  
Although the EU norms are expanded through enlargement, the often recited reason for a state 
to join the EU are the economic benefits of being inside the single market, although 
recognition as a European state as opposed to a West-Russian satellite state are also often 
mentioned. The economic incentive also has a clear link to the spreading of 5+4 norms in the 
framework of the ENP, where the access to the EU is described as proportional with the 
adherence of neighbouring countries towards EU practices and norms. Now that the 5+4 
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norms have been outlined the political apparatus, of which these norms are spread through the 
ENP, will be contextualised. 
 
 4.2 EU Foreign Policy and Framework of the ENP  
The foreign policy of the EU is a complex size to analyse. Many different actors are involved; 
both regional-, national- and community level actors. As of the scope of this project report, 
where for example Member States‟ foreign policies, as well as, common Union foreign 
policies e.g. the CFSP, are excluded, the foreign policy of EU seems a little bit less complex. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the functioning of the foreign policy of EU post 
Lisbon Treaty, focusing on the European Neighbourhood Policy as a foreign policy tool. The 
policy framework, functioning and context of the ENP will be established, in order to have a 
fundament for further analysis of the normative power influence of ENP in Ukraine and 
Moldova in later chapters. But also in order to contextualise the political apparatus for further 
analysis. 
After the Lisbon Treaty some considerable changes were agreed upon on the functioning of 
the EU foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty brought in three fundamental changes to the 
functioning of the ENP. These were; a new High Representative of the European Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR); the European External Action Service (EEAS); and 
a single legal personality of the EU (Missiroli: 2008: 9). The HR is the coordinator of the 
Unions external policies (also one of the seven vice-presidents of the Commission). This 
position was established by the Lisbon Treaty of October 2009, which states that 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy “is responsible 
for steering foreign policy and common defence policy”(Consilium.europa.eu 2010). 
“[EEAS] is not a classical foreign ministry. It is a service that has capacities ranging from 
old tasks of external activities to quasi military operations. You have things which are quite 
extraordinary so you have to develop a system that can encompass all of this. Diplomats are 
not what diplomats used to be.” (Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Special adviser to the HR 
Christoffersen in Friends of Europe 2010: 8)  
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The HR is supported by the body of EEAS. How, exactly, these new positions and institutions 
in the long run will manage to interact with each other and vis-à-vis the Commission and the 
Council is still too early to say. Nonetheless the EEAS has the effect of avoiding the gaps 
between the different EU institutions the Council and the Commission: “There is no longer a 
turf war between the Commission and high representative” (Ibid.). Thus the HR and EEAS 
bridge the opinion gap between the Council and Commission. This is also the fact because of 
the HR‟s role as vice-president of the Commission. It is within these bodies of administration 
that the ENP is decided upon. 
  
 4.2.1 Policy Development and Structure of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
The Commission has a central role in the current functioning of the ENP as well as the 
historical evolution of the shape of policy tools and the way these are applied in the policy 
area. The policy framework of the ENP is more or less directly a copy of the skeleton of the 
enlargement policy set-up (Kelley 2006: 30).  
Cooperation between the ENP and the partner countries is based upon Action Plans, Progress 
Reports and National Indicative Programs, which are composed by the EU and the partner 
countries together. The outset of the Action Plans is that of a political and economical agenda 
for reforms with short and medium term priorities. Progress Reports is an annual publication, 
which access the progress of the third countries‟ implementation of the Action Plan. The 
National Indicative Programs is a multi annual publication, which defines the focus of 
operations under the ENPI in detail. This is done by defining a limited number of priority 
areas, objectives and results to be achieved. These reports will be applied in the project‟s 
analysis of Intent, Process and Impacts of the ENP in our case countries. 
More concretely, the Action Plans are made on the basis of the association agreements of the 
enlargement policy (Kelley 2006: 32) and the Progress Reports of the enlargement policy is a 
model of the annual report of ENP (Kelley: 2006: 49). The Commission has used the 
enlargement policy set-up in a process of path-dependency and adaptation to evolve it to the 
area of ENP. Within the Commission itself the Commissioner for Enlargement and European 
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Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Füle, is in charge of enlargement and the ENP. The Directorate 
General of external relations (DG relex) within the Commission does the policy formulation 
within this area in cooperation with the other DG´s and their offices. 
ENP was established in order to bridge the gap between enlargement and non-enlargement 
areas of Europe. The ENP offers EU neighbouring countries the opportunity for development 
within; “democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy 
principles and sustainable development” (Ec.europa.eu 2010). The ENP also addresses the 
goals of the European Security Strategy agreed by the Council of European Union in 
December 2003. This strategy acknowledges that: “Security is a precondition of development. 
Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages 
criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. [...] 
Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and 
targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further 
reinforce.”(Council 2003: 2-3) Thus the Security Strategy is establishing mainly soft power 
foreign policy tools for the NPE set up of the ENP and more general external action to 
implement.  
The ENP covers the EU‟s bordering countries in the Middle East, Northern Africa and the 
Caucasus. Therefore this can be characterised as the neighbourhood of Europe. The EU has a 
great dependence on countries in these regions for energy deliveries and therefore also huge 
interests in securing stability of the same regions. The ENP Action Plans include seven 
different possible “carrots” (Kelley 2006: 37): 
1. A perspective of moving beyond co-operation to a significant degree of integration, 
including a stake in the EU´s internal market and the opportunity to participate 
progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes  
2. An upgrade in scope and intensity of political co-operation  
3. Opening of economies, reduction of trade barriers  
4. Increased financial support  
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5. Participation in community programmes promoting cultural, educational, 
environmental, technical and scientific links 
6. Support for legislative approximation to meet EU norms and standards 
7. Deepening trade and economic relations 
Furthermore the Commission can choose to make special deals with particular countries, vis-
à-vis the visa agreement with Moldova (Commission 2010 – Action Plan Moldova). These 
carrots are indirectly means of achieving normative impact in the partner countries. 
The ENP is membership neutral, and thus it does not say anything about whether a country 
has potential to become a Member State, nor does it offer membership (Bechev and Nicolaidis 
2010: 477). When that is stressed, countries as Ukraine and Moldova with membership 
aspirations will, ceteris paribus, become more attractive as future Members States to the 
extent that they successfully implement the reform initiatives of the Action Plans.  
 
 4.2.2 Enlargement and ENP 
Relations between enlargement and the ENP is somewhat characterised by the political 
sensitivity of the issue. Thus it is often a political instead of an administrative decision 
whether countries should join the Union. The enlargement policy vis-à-vis the ENP will be 
elaborated in order to establish a context of which further analysis of the balancing act 
between membership and association in a later chapter. 
Some countries have through a semi boycott of the ENP stressed that they want accession 
talks instead. This was the case with Ukraine; sending its head of delegation instead of the 
foreign minister, in order to stress a distance from other ENP countries and that it has 
ambitions of membership talks (Sasse: 2010: 188).  
The enlargement policy of EU has often been stressed as the most successful foreign policy 
achievement of the Union (Keukeleire 2008). Thus the functioning of this foreign policy area 
will be outlined in order for us to be able to apply the relations and overlaps between 
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enlargement and ENP. The conditions for accession of countries to the EU are described in 
article 6 and 49 in TEU. Article 6 states that; 1. The Union is founded on the principles of 
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, 
principles which are common to the Member States. 2. The Union shall respect fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community 
law. 3.   The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States. 4. The Union 
shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its 
policies. (TEU 2008) 
Furthermore, article 49, states that any European country can join if it satisfies the criteria. In 
addition an applicant country must satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria before negotiations on the 
acquis communautaire can start. This core criterion states that a country wanting to join needs 
to have: “stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy, as well as the 
capacity to cope with the pressure of competition and market forces at work inside the Union; 
the ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular adherence to the objectives 
of political, economic and monetary union.”(Ibid)  This is basically reflects the 5+4 norms, as 
described earlier in this project. Therefore the normative application of enlargement is very 
much the same as the ENP. This means that the ENP can be described as a light form of 
membership. 
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 5. Foreign Policy Rivalry in Eastern Europe 
 
This section is concretising the foreign policy rivalry in Eastern Europe and the Foreign Pol-
icy of Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Lastly the Russian interpretation of and attitudes to-
wards the ENP will be explained.In order to determine the extent of Normative Intent, Process 
and Impact of the ENP in Moldova and Ukraine, this project report takes into consideration 
that both case studies are positioned in the geopolitical area between EU and Russia. There is 
a historical connection between Russia and Moldova/Ukraine and all three countries address 
directly to each other in their current foreign policy objectives. 
Jan Steinkohl claims that all international actors possess and advocate values that they aim to 
disseminate internationally, if these norms clash, it is possible that they became hindrances 
for the EU in terms of normative power application and even result in normative power riva-
lry between Russia and the EU (Steinkohl 2010). He describes these norms as “principles of 
rules that guide the behaviour of international actors” (Steinkohl 2010: 4). Thus, if these 
norms become incompatible they may result in rivalry. Steinkohl explains that in this context 
“international actors compete conflicting in a zero-sum fashion, which results in threatening 
the goal-seeking capabilities of other actors” (Steinkohl 2010: 4), including normative disa-
greements (Manners and Tocci: 2008). Therefore, in the case of the ENP foreign policy tool 
may cause tensions between the EU and Russia, dependent on what interests are embedded 
within the territories, where both actors actively present.   
In terms of policy objectives, the clash of norms generates a conflict of policies, or gridlock in 
the international system. Manners and Tocci use the example of the Estonian case, where the 
backing of divergent different norms by Russia, which were the defense of minority rights 
and recollection of historical memory, and EU norms of sovereignty, solidarity and indepen-
dence  resulted in standstill (Manners and Tocci 2008: 315). Although Russia does recognize 
European values, it does not recognize it in terms of application to its own foreign policy 
measures in third countries. (Makarychev 2004) 
 
On the basis of non-interference, cooperation and mutual respect Russia supported President 
Lukashenko‟s regime in Belarus, in which organised death squads hindered political plurality 
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(Manners and Tocci  2008: 316). This is another example of normative rivalry; hence the di-
rect contrast to EU‟s 5+4 norms EU because of the failure to promote human rights and de-
mocracy in Belarus. Another example of normative rivalry is the case of the Orange Revolu-
tion in Ukraine in the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005, where protesters successfully 
achieved regime change on the basis of peaceful demonstrations for liberal democracy, human 
rights and good governance (Manners and Tocci 2008). Thus, Russia perceived EU involve-
ment as “an attempt to install pro-Western regimes in the neighbourhood and perhaps ulti-
mately in Russia itself” (Manners and Tocci 2008: 316). 
 
 5.1 Foreign Policy Rivalry between Russia and EU in Moldova and 
Ukraine 
In the case of Moldova, the Transnistrian conflict is an example of a disagreement in regional 
interests. Russia‟s stand on the issue is justified by its security concern in the CIS area. In the 
past four years no concrete decisions or progress has been made by the EU in conflict 
settlement in the area, apart from various attempts to initiate dialogue with Russia 
(osw.waw.pl 2010). The opposed views and the aspiration to induce change in Moldova 
exemplifies normative rivalry, when the foreign policy of Russia and the EU are driven by 
divergent values and norms. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has been attempting to target 
the cooperation in EU-Russia security negotiations, which can be explained by the EU 
inducing a form of conditionality on terms on which Russia can expect full cooperation, in 
turn for the withdrawal of military presence in Transnistria (osw.waw.pl 2010). Recent 
negotiations in October 2010 at the Munich Conference on Security Policy have shown that 
Russia moved closer to an agreement with the EU about removing military troops from the 
area. Russia stated, that effective power must have emerged in Moldova, and that Moldova 
and Transnistria came close to coming to terms, before Russia would withdraw military forces 
Moreover, Romania should not intervene in the subject (osw.waw.pl 2010). Dependent on the 
interpretation of this statement, Russia either is prepared to settle the conflict, or it is merely 
an ostensible reason to justify its unwillingness to settle the conflict, as for Romania for 
example, is an EU country. Thus, divergent values in the case of the Transnistrian conflict do 
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collide and result in normative rivalry between Russia and the EU, having consequences for 
the normative impact in Moldova. 
In the case of Ukraine and Russia, there has been a historically interconnectedness and 
Ukraine‟s position has been debated between Russia and the West (Mankoff 2009: 252). One 
of the main conflicts and issues are centred on Ukraine as a transit country between the EU 
and Russia in delivering gas. The 2008 dispute on the cut of gas supplies, demonstrated 
Russia‟s dominance and ability to attain its will. Although the EU continues agreements with 
Ukraine to reinforce developments in the gas sector, the gas itself comes from Russia and it 
does make up a substantial part of the Ukrainian economy, making Ukraine vulnerable and 
dependent on Russia. According to a Ukrainian forum “Ukraine has agreed in exchange to 
extend the term of the Russian Black Sea Fleet presence in the country's Crimea for 25 more 
years [in return] for a discount of $100 per 1,000 cu m at the natural gas price of $330 and a 
30% discount on other prices” (foRum 2010).  his deal is an example of how interconnected 
Ukrainian and Russian relations are. As a critique, Tony Barber stated, European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Füle, has not 
addressed the agreement with Russia (Barber 2010). It is important to note, that this is a rather 
economical based argument, but it is important in EU relations with Ukraine, when compared 
to that of Russia. If it is assumed that the values of Ukraine are substantially justified by its 
economic stands, then there will be more alignment with Russia and alienation to the EU. 
This is a possible hindrance in the lack of EU cooperation with Ukraine. 
 
 5.1.1 Foreign policy of Russia towards Europe 
As the consequences of the Cold War are constantly being eliminated, the developments in 
international relations resulted in broadening the scope of cooperation on a global level for 
Russia (mid.ru 2010). Thus, Russia has become more engaged in international cooperation, 
including an agenda of various objectives for the US, China, and India.  Yet, the main focus of 
the Russia foreign policy is "national security, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, to achieve strong positions of authority in the world community that best 
meet the interests of the Russian Federation" (mid.ru 2010). Russia and Europe are 
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economically dependent on each other “caught between mutual dependence and mutual fear” 
(Mankoff 2009: 216), although in comparison to the US, where there is a traditional security 
threat issue, the relationship with Europe is complex due to the geographical vicinity.  After 
the Cold War, Europe has developed a set of norms and values different from those of Russia 
(Mankoff 2009). Russia's foreign policy is centered on traditional measures of power and 
sovereignty. Thus, Russia is fixated on traditional security matters and in certain international 
issues, Europe and Russia have had clashing interests and approaches to conflict resolution, 
exemplified in the recent Kosovo conflict. Moreover, the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) of which Ukraine is a de facto participant and Moldova a member, has been 
historically dominated by Russia. In the past decade Russia has attempted to establish itself as 
a key player in the region, especially under the regime of President Vladimir Putin, being 
fixed on a “paternalistic view of Russia‟s relationship to its former constituencies” (Mankoff 
2009: 241). Thus, both the EU and Russia‟s foreign policy objectives are focused upon their 
neighbourhood and itself, but there are central differences in how the two approach the 
process of achieving these regional objectives. 
 
 5.1.2 Russian Policy on the ENP 
As mentioned earlier, EU‟s incentives and the application of normative power could be said to 
have other incentives than being a force for good. Russia criticises the ENP as a strategy of 
the EU for being a tool of globalisation and an example of how the European integration 
process is being transferred beyond its boundaries (Haukkala 2010: 6). 
The EU was moreover criticised for a dominant role in its regional sphere, which also 
included Russia. As Haukkala stated: “The effect of cultivating normatively and materially 
asymmetrical relationships [and] the universal applicability of its own internal mode of 
governance also for the third parties [could be described as] regional normative hegemony, 
especially in Europe and its immediate neighbourhood” (Haukkala 2010: 4). 
Thus, while the EU promotes universally applicable norms and applies soft measures of 
power in attempt to ameliorate the economic and political circumstances of its 
neighbourhood, it may be perceived as a regional normative hegemony, which is seen by 
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Russia as “harmful intrusion into Russia‟s own sovereign prerogatives, including relations 
with its neighbours” (Haukkala 2009: 6). In fact, in 2006 Vladimir Chizhov stated that 
“Russia is neither a subject nor an object of the European Neighbourhood Policy” (Chizhov 
2006 in Haukkala 2009: 7). Thus the ENP is seen as a restriction of Russian influence in the 
geopolitical area between the EU and Russia. Such divergences in foreign policy are 
conflictual. As Haukkala states, “behind [Russia‟s] emphasis of equality and sovereignty 
seems to be an underlying understanding of world politics as an arena of uncompromising 
battle of interests and struggle for domination” (Haukkala 2009: 4). This implies a rather 
clear neo-realistic foreign policy approach.  
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 6. Intent, Process and Impact of the ENP 
 
In the following chapter the theoretical frame will be applied to various empirical sources. 
First there will be an analysis of how the EU views its own intent and process with the ENP. 
Secondly there will be an analysis of Intent, Process and Impact in each of the two case 
countries based on triangulation of sources. Third and last there will be an overall discussion 
of whether this project can say that the ENP has coherent and normative Intent, Process and 
Impact based on the findings in our cases. 
 
 6.1 Intent and Process in the ENP 
In the following part the focus will be on how well the 9 norms identified by Ian Manners 
correspond to EU foreign policy of the ENP, and whether the ENP process is intended to be a 
normative process.  
 
 6.1.1 Intent of the ENP 
As explained earlier, Manners has identified the norms of the EU as five core norms; peace, 
liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, plus four minor norms; 
social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance 
(Manners 2002). Many of these norms are written into the founding the articles of the Treaty 
on European Union: 
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”(TEU 2008) 
These sentiments are also found as general principles for how the EU should conduct its 
foreign relations (including the ENP): 
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“The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the 
wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
solidarity, and respect for the United Nations Charter and international law”(Ibid) 
So far there is full coherency between the values of the EU, and the principles of its foreign 
policy strategy. This leads us to the intent of the ENP. In the founding document for the ENP 
from 2003 (Commission 2003) it is stated that at the Copenhagen European Council in 2002 it 
was confirmed that:  
“the Union should take the opportunity offered by enlargement to enhance relations with its 
neighbours on the basis of shared values
7
.[...]...to avoid drawing new dividing lines in 
Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the 
Union.[...]...and called for enhanced relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the 
Southern Mediterranean countries to be based on a long term approach promoting reform, 
sustainable development and trade...”(Commssion 2003: 3-4).8  
In the same document it is stated that the benefits for countries that join the ENP would be:  
“...the prospect of a stake in the EU's Internal market and further integration and 
liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital (four 
freedoms)” (Commission 2003:4). 
Thus the intent of the ENP is et al to promote democracy, respect for human rights and the 
rule of law as well as sustainable development and liberty (as the four freedoms). So far, these 
norms correspond with those of the EU. However, the intent of the ENP is also stated as an 
attempt to avoid a divided Europe and to increase the prosperity of both the EU and its 
neighbours via market access. It is up to discussion whether avoidance of a divided Europe 
                                                          
7 Notably democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as set out within the EU in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
8
    Bold and footnote from original document 
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should be seen as an argument for peace or if it is a way for the EU to grab power in states 
heavily influenced by Russia, who still refers to Eastern Europe as the post soviet space. The 
answer to this discussion will be given later in this project as part of the analysis of EU's 
process and impact in the case countries of Moldova and Ukraine. 
 
6.1.2 Process of the ENP 
The analysis of normative process is important to determine if the ENP can confirm a 
framework that reflects a force for „good‟ and not only promotes norms in a third country 
without the contribution of the third country. This include openness towards external inputs, 
(self-)criticism and reflection by third parties. 
The previously ratified treaties, bilateral agreements and other contracts established through 
institutions such as the OSCE or the Council of Europe, and the UN Human Rights 
Declaration embody a normative Intent that is embedded in the framework of the ENP.  First, 
the EU norms are legitimised by external sources as a “key benchmark that should include the 
ratification and implementation of international commitments, which demonstrate respect for 
shared values” (Commission 2003: 16) where organizations like the Council of Europe are 
encouraged to interact more closely with the ENP countries. Involving external sources of 
legitimacy, such as the UN, results in more consistency and coherence in the way norms are 
embedded in the ENP.  By living up to these norms and displaying international dedication, 
the EU demonstrates a normative process (Manners: 2010: 38). 
Furthermore, there is an emphasis on communication between institutions, NGOs, ministers, 
parties and social groups to ensure a differentiation of EU policy. This is stated in the Actions 
Plans that are tailored to the specific needs of the ENP country in question (Manners 2010: 
40-41). In addition, the notion of joint-ownership reflects a co-operative measure induced by 
the EU, to continuously evaluate and shape agreements between EU itself and the ENP 
partner countries.  
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Overall, the framework of the ENP presents a retrospective approach towards policy 
formulation in ENP countries. The above mentioned considerations embedded in the ENP 
would constitute a normative foreign policy, but the question is whether EU and the ENP 
countries agree on how open and how mutual the ENP development has been. 
  
 6.2 Intent, Process and Impact of ENP in Moldova and Ukraine 
This analysis will explain if (and how) the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) have had 
any normative influence in shaping the political climate in Moldova and Ukraine towards a 
more EU friendly agenda. As an overall question this part of the analysis will answer whether 
or not the ENP has been exporting the core norms of the EU to the political environment of 
Moldova and Ukraine, and trace impact in political institutional developments. The analysis is 
focusing on the theory field on Normative Power, which has been explained in chapter 3. As 
mentioned in the theory chapter Niemann and de Wekker puts forward three indicators, which 
can be used to recognise, observe and measure Normative Power. These indicators are as 
mentioned: Intent, Process and Impact. This analysis will be drawing on examples from 
speeches, articles and reports that will be analysed and discussed on the background of the 
project‟s theory field, which not only take Normative Power into consideration, but also 
focuses on Neo-liberalism and Neo-realism. This means that even though Normative Power is 
the main theory of this project, when it comes to explaining the cooperation that takes place 
under the framework of the ENP, we are still aware of the different perceptions of the field of 
international relations, and will be looking at other perspectives and answers to the problems 
that are being processed in this analysis. 
 
 6.2.1 ENP Intent in Moldova 
Moldova has been part of the ENP for years, and became a direct bordering country of the 
Union after the 2007 accession of Bulgaria and Romania. Thus this accession made a general 
handling of relations with countries of this region more pertinent. The EU has great interest in 
bordering countries such as Moldova. As a bordering country, Moldova‟s internal affairs such 
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as poverty and crime can easily become EU affairs through illegal immigration and the spread 
of crime. Therefore the Union has both an interest in spreading genuine norms for selfless 
purposes but also in order to secure the human security of the EU citizens. This duality can be 
seen in the fact that the security strategy of the EU, which acknowledges the need of securing 
Union territory, serves as basis of the focus and direction of the Union external action.  
The relationship between Moldova and the EU was established by the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement in 1994, which entered into force in 1998. This was followed by the 
first EU-Moldova ENP Action Plan of 2005. After the accession of Romania, Moldova 
focused on the possibility of membership and thus the EU and Moldova saw the occasion as a 
chance to “enhance their relations and to promote stability, security and well-being” 
(Commission 2010 – Action Plan Moldova ) of Moldovan citizens,  as stated in the Action 
Plan. Moreover, it is mentioned that the EU was highly focused on Moldova‟s implementation 
of political, economic and institutional reforms as well as conflict prevention, specifically the 
case of Transnistria. As mentioned before, economic interests will not be analysed in depth, 
but will be considered as either cunning incentives or modest sacrifices when normative intent 
is not justified or validated on the basis of normative values. According to the Moldova 
National Indicative Program 2011-2013, the EU divides its main priorities and goals into three 
priority areas (Commission 2010 – National Indicative Program: 3) 
 Priority area 1 has the rule of law, good governance and security as overall priority, 
while Public administration reform and Facilitation of new EU-Moldova Agreement is 
being denoted as sub-priorities. 
 Priority area 2 has Social and human development as its overall priority. This also 
includes Social protection, Health system reform, labour market reform and education 
as sub-priorities.     
 Priority area 3 has Trade and Sustainable Development as overall priority, with  
Facilitation of deep and comprehensive free trade area, Regional and local develop-
ment and Environment & energy efficiency / renewable energy and diversification as 
sub-priorities. 
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 The Indicative budget for the period 2011- 2013 is on €273.12 million (Commission 2009: 
13). The resources will be divided to the three priority areas. Priority area 1 and 2 will be 
allocated 35-40% of the budget and priority area 2 will be allocated 25-30% of the budget. 
Furthermore the EU have included a 15% overall allocation for conflict resolution and 
confidence-building measures (Commission 2009: 13). This is primarily because of the 
current issues with the Transnistria region, which according to the EU is mainly caused by the 
lack of good governance and fundamental democratic institutions, leading to social diversity. 
An improvement of the attractiveness of the Moldovan state through the resolving of the 
above mentioned problems should according to the Indicative Program strengthen the social 
cohesion in the Region and hence drawing Transnistria closer to Moldova again. It is obvious 
that the EU consider the Transnistria issue as a destabilising factor in the region, and is very 
interested in solving the conflict. It is also obvious that the EU must be very careful in how it 
approaches the problem, considering the many actors with interest in the region. In this matter 
it is not possible to avoid the importance of Russian influence. The soft policy approach of 
NPE that the EU have decided to follow in resolving the Transnistria issue, can therefore be 
interpreted as the best possible approach to the problem, without causing a diplomatic conflict 
with Russia. However, it cannot be overlooked that the presence of Russian troops in the 
Transnistria region is a security issue for the EU, and the resources put into conflict also 
reflects that.     
In the Actions Plan and the National Indicative Programs, one of the first normative intents of 
the EU has been the further strengthening of the stability and effectiveness of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, which are the highest of priority on the list of 
objectives in the Action Plan. Objectives such as the settlement of the Transnistria conflict, 
insurance of correct ensuring the democratic conduct of parliamentary elections, institutions 
guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, the implementation of judiciary reforms, and the 
fight against corruption were at the centre of the Action Plan for Moldova. 
The ensuring of the support for democratic development and good governance, about 25-35% 
of the € 209.7 million budget for Moldova, were set aside in the period of 2007-2010 
(Commission 2007: 3), and in the period of 2011-2013 (Commission 2009: 13), even more, 
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namely 35-40% of the € 273.12 million budget were planned to support the normative intent 
of the EU. The fact that one third of the budget was set aside for the purpose shows that the 
EU was rather serious about the developments in the area, let alone the higher amount 
planned for the period of 2011-2013. Considering the amount of financial assistance that 
could be placed elsewhere, this does reflect commitment on behalf of the EU for the sake of 
democratic development. Regarding the issue of the unsuccessful parliamentary elections of 
April 2009, according to the statement made by Mr Kálmán Mizsei, EU Special 
Representative for the Republic of Moldova “the EU has helped to mobilise a broad 
international presence and support in order to ensure that the elections on July 29
th
 are 
conducted democratically and to remedy the concerns that were raised in the context of the 
April elections” (Consilium 2009). In the context of the Commission and the United Nations 
Development Programme offered a € 2 million grant contract to implement the Electoral 
Support to the Republic of Moldova project and stated that “several civil society 
organisations [were] working to promote citizens' participation in the electoral process” 
(europa.eu 2009). After the elections, the OSCE/ODIHR International Election Observation 
Mission assessed the elections as “well-administered overall and allowed for competition 
among political parties representing a plurality of views” (europa.eu 2009).  
In the case of Human rights and fundamental freedoms of human beings, the EU from the 
start has been conscious about “ensuring respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, in line with international and 
European  standards” as stated in the Action Plan for Moldova (Commission 2004) During 
the 2009 July elections “street riots met with serious violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms by the law enforcement bodies [and]  non- governmental organisations 
report continuing discriminatory treatment of the Roma  population” (Commission 2010: 2), 
according to the Progress Report of 2010. 
Several EU bodies have been involved in consultations between the Government and the EU 
Political and Security Committee, the Council Working Party on Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia, and the Political Directors‟ Troika, as well as the European Court of Human Rights 
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(Commission 2010: 3). This involvement represents a serious interest and intent in upholding 
human rights in Moldova. 
In addition, a recent launch of a human rights dialog justifies EU‟s commitment to the 
promotion of human rights in Moldova and has been planned to be held once a year.  
Preceding the first meeting and the consultations, the EU convened with representatives of 
Moldovan and international NGOs in order to “keep with the EU‟s practice of incorporating 
the voice of society into its meetings on human rights with third countries” (europa.eu 2010) 
including organizations such as United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (europa.eu 2010), which is definitely 
a normative intent.  
 
 6.2.2 Peace and Conflict Prevention 
The first priority of the Action Plan is the conflict of Transnistria, which has been an issue of 
Moldova, as well as Ukraine, ever since the fall of the Soviet Union. According to Kristi Raik, 
one of the reasons behind the unresolved conflict is that fact that “the authoritarian regime of 
Transnistria has survived in account of the military assistance from Russia and the presence 
of Russian troops” (Raik 2006: 100). The OSCE has been the main actor in attempting to 
solve the conflict in 2004 (Neukirch 2005), while the European Union has become more 
engaged as its relations with Moldova strengthened through the ENP and the European Border 
Assistance Mission (EUBAM) (Commission 2010). In terms of democracy and democratic 
governance, if there were any developments in the Transnistria region, this would be a major 
issue for the authoritarian regime of Transnistria.  
Moreover, if the EU was to induce a change in the conflict, Russia would need to change its 
current position on the Transnistrian issue and fulfil the OSCE Summit in Istanbul 
commitments (ape.md 2010) As most efforts have been unsuccessful on behalf of the EU 
while the past four years negotiations with Russia have been frozen, it seems that the EU 
initiated a conditional proposal in dissolving the conflict. In October 2010 Angela Merkel 
proposed conflict resolution in Transnistria as a condition for EU-Russian Political and 
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Security Committee (osw.waw.pl 2010).  Subsequently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
resubmitted her proposal in Deuwille with negotiations including Russian President Dmitri 
Medvedev and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, to resume the 5 + 2 talks on the issue of 
Transnistria between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria, mediated by Russia, Ukraine 
and the OSCE under the observation of the EU and the US (osw.waw.pl 2010).  Thus, since 
the last round of analytical criticism on the topic (Niemann and de Wekker), it seems that the 
EU began renegotiating and directly addressing the issue with Russia through a more direct 
dialogue.  
 
 6.2.3 ENP Intent in Ukraine 
With the Eastern Enlargement of the EU in 2004, the EU moved one step closer to Ukraine. 
From the past of being an external actor in the region, the EU became a direct neighbour to 
Ukraine and hence also irrevocably a part of a region, which once were considered the 
external borders of the former Soviet Union. This role was further enhanced in 2007 with 
Bulgaria and Romania joining the EU in 2007. As in the case with Moldova, one of the main 
issues between the EU and Ukraine is that internal affairs in Ukraine, such as poverty and 
crime, can directly influence EU affairs through illegal immigration and the spread of crime 
between the borders. Furthermore, recent conflicts on the gas supply between Ukraine and 
Russia have directly influenced the stability of the energy supply in several EU Member 
States.  
The role of the EU as a democracy promoting actor in Ukraine is relatively new, and is linked 
to the ENP, which were launched in 2003-04. Before, the EU focused more on stability and 
market reforms, rather than the more ideological approach of political transformation (Lupu 
2010).   
The first contractual relations between the EU and Ukraine began in 1994 with the EU-
Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which entered into force in 1998. This 
agreement was later basis for the EU-Ukraine Action Plan under the ENP, which were 
adopted in 2005. At the moment the most important official paper on EU-Ukrainian 
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cooperation through the framework of the ENP is the multi annual National Indicative 
Program, which sets up priority and goals for the future cooperation between the two. When 
comparing the National Indicative Program to our theory on Normative Power it is quite clear 
that there are consistency between the core norms of the EU and the priority areas, which 
have been set up. According to the National Indicative Program the period 2011-2013, the EU 
divides its main priorities and goals into three priority areas (Comission 2010 - National 
Indicative Program): 
 Priority area 1 has Good Governance and the Rule of Law as overall priority, while 
Justice, Freedom, Security, Integrated Border Management, Public Administration 
Reform, Public Financial Management and Disarmament is being denoted as sub-
priorities. 
 Priority area 2 has Facilitation of the entry into force of the EU-Ukraine Association 
Agreement as overall priority. This also includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area. Facilitation of the entry into force of the Association Agreement is 
mentioned as a sub-priority.     
 Priority area 3 has Sustainable Development as overall priority, with Energy, 
Environment and Climate Change, Transport and Regional and Rural Development as 
sub-priorities. 
 
The Indicative budget for the period 2011- 2013 is on €470.05 million. The resources will be 
divided to the three priority areas. Priority area 1 will be allocated 20-30% of the budget, 
priority area 2 will be allocated 25-35% of the budget and priority area 3 will be allocated 45-
55% of the budget. Furthermore the EU has earmarked €43.37 million for institution building 
programmes, which falls under the development of good governance and enhancement of rule 
of law. All in all it is quite clear that the overall focus point of the EU is on strengthening the 
institutions of the government and decreasing corruption and crime through rule of law and 
further enhancement of good governance. This also corresponds well with the Indicative 
Program, where it is stated that:  
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“The promotion of good governance and respect for the rule of law are fundamental 
principles in the relationship between the EU and Ukraine and consequently feature as 
priorities in the new EU Ukraine Association Agreement currently being negotiated and the 
Association Agenda. Reforms in these sectors are critical not only to the full enjoyment of 
human rights but also to efforts to combat corruption...” (Comission 2010 – National 
Indicative Program).  
The link between the words of the Indicative Program and the core norms of the EU, is 
relative easy to identify. The question, however, is if it can be decided if the EU‟s intent can 
be defined as genuinely normative. In our theory chapter 3 the project reflects on importance 
of whether or not the norms acts as the centre of relations between the EU and Ukraine. Is the 
agreements focused around the norms or are the norms peripheral to the EU‟s engagement? 
When it comes to priority area 1 of the Indicative Program, the norms must be seen as being 
the centre of the agreement. It is clear that the EU consider the norms of good governance, the 
rule of law and human rights as being fundamental to the future relations between the two 
actors. Furthermore the effort of the EU is backed with a budget of €470 million, which helps 
to prove the seriousness of the EU‟s wishes to further develop the Ukrainian democratic 
institutions. Another question is then if these actions can be interpreted as serving in the self-
interest of the EU, and therefore be seen as less genuine. In this context, it will undoubtedly 
be in the interest of the EU to improve the democratic institutions of Ukraine and through this 
not only stabilise the region, but also improve the relations between the two. Furthermore it 
must be considered that the spreading of rule of law and good governance also reduce crime 
and immigration from Ukraine, which in the long run can only be perceived as being in 
favour of the EU. But this must also be seen in context of the fact that even though the EU 
will have serious gains on this background, Ukraine will at a minimum experience the same 
gains as the EU. 
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 6.2.5 ENP Process in Moldova 
Normative process can justify whether “the EU really is a force for good that cannot exclude 
external input, and has (self-)criticism and reflection about the possible impact of its action” 
(Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 9). Thus, through investigating normative process, it is 
possible to define the extent to which the EU acts in a Eurocentric manner or focuses on 
inclusiveness, engagement, and dialogue with the ENP partners. 
Inclusiveness can be defined by “extent to which Moldova was included in the drafting 
process of the ENP Action Plan and how involved it is in Union programs today” (Niemann 
and de Wekker 2010: 18). It is important to note that  in the 2010 Action Plan the EU states 
that “the level of ambition of the relationship will depend on the degree of Moldova‟s 
commitment to common values as well as its capacity to implement jointly agreed priorities” 
(Commission 2010), a statement implying a rather conditional relationship. It is, therefore 
important to examine the level of inclusiveness in EU-Moldovan relations. As from the point 
of view of inclusiveness, the example of the 2009 parliamentary elections in April could be 
said to have been negotiated between the EU and Moldova in a dynamic way.  On the grounds 
of demonstrations in response to putative electoral fraud and failure to elect a President, as 
well as the dissolution of the Parliament, amendments to the electoral code were made, to 
diminish the entry for verification of elections of political parties represented in the 
Parliament (Commission 2010: 4). The fact that the Council of Europe Venice Commission 
saluted these suggestions by the Moldovan government, and induced other recommendations, 
shows an interaction in changes made by both parties. Although these changes were later 
discarded, after the well-administered elections in 2009, consultations were induced by the 
Council of Europe Venice Commission to provide guidance on constitutional changes. In the 
case of the Transnistrian conflict, The EU claimed Moldovan cooperation with the European 
Union on “all questions related to the Transnistria settlement efforts, including in the work of 
the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) and in confidence-
building efforts” (Commission 2010: 8) in which not only Moldova, but also Ukraine were 
involved. On the other hand, in order to deepen cooperation, the Moldovan government 
requested a regional office of the EUBAM mission by December 2009 (gov.md 2009).  
Interestingly, the EU noted that EU-Moldova relations suffered in 2009 and that political 
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dialogue with the EU and the Moldovan authorities‟ interaction with international institutions 
have decreased (Commission 2010 – Action Plan Moldova). This addressed by the EU 
illustrates a genuine concern on behalf of the EU about the lack of communication with 
Moldova, which exemplifies an incentive to implement more inclusiveness. 
Another way to determine Process is to examine the extent of reflexivity. To do this there 
must be a focus on the extent “decision-makers make a conscious effort to critically analyse 
the expected effects of their proposed measures, rather than behaving in a „routine-based‟ 
manner” (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 20).  
The changes made to the three priority areas of the two National Indicative Programmes on 
Moldova/Ukraine from 2007-2010 to 2011-2013, indicate a reflexive EU approach. There is a 
considerable difference and positive targeting of specific issues as to what policy areas are 
focused on by the EU. This also reflects a rather dynamic process, as opposed to a routine 
based method of treatment of both Moldova and Ukraine on behalf of the EU. Moreover, 
there is constant monitoring of Moldova and its actions on the process of implementing the 
bilateral agreements; the developments are evaluated each year through Progress Reports. The 
conclusions in the Progress Reports are addressed by the European Union and although some 
of the communication seems repetitive and less concrete, there is a different approach to the 
problem and often, e.g.: in the case of the Human Rights Dialogue, new initiatives and 
agreements are tailored for Moldova, in order to implement the observations made in the 
progress reports. Furthermore, the European Parliaments‟ (EP) Analysis of the 2011-2013 
Moldova National Indicative Programme, demonstrates a reflection on the objectives. This 
includes a criticism of the Programme, which according to the EP “is very much in the old, 
pre- Lisbon Treaty paradigm of EC action as development and aid” (European Parliament 
2010: 4). In the case of Ukraine, the EP concludes that “many objectives of the 2011-13 Mol-
dova National Indicative Programme are formulated in general and vague terms, thus creating 
scope for process-oriented rather than impact-oriented assistance” (European Parliament 
2010: 3). On the other hand, considering the lack of communication between the draft of the 
Commission‟s National Indicative Programme and the analysis made by the European Par-
liament suggest that there is not enough reflection on the National Indicative Programmes be-
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fore implementing the it. This reflects the lack of reflexivity and conscious effort in the 
process of drafting the paper, especially when it is pointed out that the needs of Ukraine and 
Moldova are not fulfilled. 
Furthermore the EU could justify itself as a normative power by legitimizing itself through 
the application of universal norms, that are seen as universally normative. This is important 
“since the EU‟s self-understanding as a „force for good‟ risks being linked to a particular 
context, and may not correspond to the understanding of „goodness‟ in other parts of the 
world, and the EU could be faithful to „its‟ norms, while being perceived as an imperial 
power” (Sjursen 2006: 248) in Niemann and de Wekker. As in the case of Ukraine and 
Moldova, both countries are neighbouring the European Union. And, as the Union itself is 
concerned with its foreign policy towards its immediate neighbours through the ENP, 
promoting norms that of the EU could easily be identified as a method pertaining to the EU‟s 
neo-imperial incentives to gain regional power. Universal norms, such as democracy and 
human rights are evident in the negations and documents presented by the EU.  This is 
supported by the inclusion of various NGOs and international institutions. For example, the 
local elections in Moldova and the Transnistrian conflict have been monitored by the OSCE 
and Moldova is also in co-operation with Human Rights Committee, the Committee against 
Torture and the Committee for the Rights of the Child (Commission 2010 – Progress Report 
Moldova: 5). 
 
 6.2.7 ENP Process in Ukraine 
The EU and Ukraine met at a summit in Brussels November 22, where they agreed on an 
„Action Plan‟ that Kiev hopes will lead to visa-free travel for Ukrainians within the 27-nation 
bloc.  
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy was at the summit flanked by Ukrainian 
President Viktor Yanukovych and European Commission chief Jose Manuel Barroso, and 
made the announcement at the end of the talks: 
"I'm very pleased that we can announce today an action plan for Ukraine toward the 
establishment of a visa-free regime for short-stay travel," he said. "We have also been able to 
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sign a protocol to the current partnership and cooperation agreement permitting Ukraine's 
access to the EU programs. And we expressed our satisfaction at the progress achieved in 
EU-Ukraine relations. (euobserver.com 2010)"  
The plan for visa-free travel calls on Kiev to improve its border controls as well as its 
migration and asylum policies, and no firm timetable is given for its implementation. 
However this announcement shows that there is an increase cooperation and integration 
between the two, and that the EU is also bending towards the demands of Ukraine. The visa-
free travel calls, although periodic, must be interpret as a Ukrainian demand and the fact that 
the EU is ready to follow policy changes put forward by the partner country, which does not 
necessarily gains the EU most. 
In contrast to Yanukovych's previous visit to Brussels in September, when top EU officials 
expressed concern at political developments in Kyiv, Van Rompuy praised the current 
Ukrainian leadership.  
"Ukraine is seeing a period of political stability with close coordination between the president 
and the government, based on a strong parliamentarian majority," Van Rompuy said. "This 
enables Ukraine to move forward with important reforms."(Ibid)  
Both Van Rompuy and Barroso, who received Yanukovych in Brussels, said that if the reform 
process continues, Ukraine can hope to conclude a free-trade agreement with the EU by next 
summer. This is a good example of that the norms projected by the Union is being backed 
with economical gain for Ukraine. This also illustrates the genuineness of EU actions, when 
the norm adaption is the rule for economical cooperation, and not vice versa. This is further 
backed by Van Rompuy‟s heavy focus on other key EU norms. At the summit he said EU 
leaders did remind Yanukovych of the need to observe the rule of law and human rights both 
core norms of the EU and thereby fundamental priorities.  
"Democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights are the core values we share and 
strive to implement in practice," he said. "And we also discussed and emphasized the 
importance of respect for freedom of the media, freedom of assembly, and freedom of 
association, and the protection of human rights defenders."( rferl.org 2010). 
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In relations with Ukraine and seen in perspective to the past couple of years gas-conflicts with 
Russia, the EU's energy concerns are always near the top of the list and Barroso 
acknowledged that with the statement:  
"I particularly welcomed the very strong political statement made by President Yanukovych 
during our summit today that we will never have a gas crisis like the one we had before," 
Barroso said. "That's one of the reasons why we believe that it's so important [to have] this 
triangular relationship between Ukraine, Russia, and the European Union." (ibid.) 
This was replied by the Ukrainian president Yanukovych, who assured that gas supplies 
would flow through the upcoming winter: "I would like to tell our European friends once 
again that Ukraine guarantees an uninterrupted supply of energy resources to Europe,"(Ibid.)  
The gas dispute is, however, a political issue, which reflects EU self-interests more thatn it 
reflects norm change. The focus is clearly on avoiding another gas dispute between Ukraine 
and Russia, and not on reforming the intuitions and infrastructure, which is the cause of it.   
 
 6.2.8 ENP Impact in Moldova 
The EU‟s impact of Normative Power Europe trough ENP in Moldova is affected first and 
foremost by the fact that the country is poor and undeveloped with lack effective political 
institutions. This means that there is lack of bureaucracy, thus it is expected that the 
implementation of law is only “in the most superficial form of European integration” (Sasse: 
2010: 194). Moldova is positive towards EU and acknowledges EU integration as an 
important step. This can be seen in the set up of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European 
Integration. Thus the foreign affairs of European integration are placed in a focal point of 
Moldova‟s foreign policy.  
For Moldova solving the Transnistrian issue is important, and has a separate chapter in the 
Action Plan. The impact though, is for the time being limited to setting up different 
negotiation settings for the parties to cooperate in. More concretely the impact of the ENP in 
relation to Moldova is that it is to “have contributed to channeling the intermittent regional 
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momentum for conflict management into regular contacts and talks” (Ibid). Thus, ENP 
enables an institutionalized setting in order to engage with the parties in conflict solving, 
where the EU is indirectly through the ENP an actor in the conflict. 
Moldova has set up two NGO‟s; Euromonitor and Euroforum, in order to monitor the 
implementation of the Action Plans and other ENP goals (Sasse: 2010: 198). This is a quite 
important initiative in terms of good governance.  
The European Commission (EC) acknowledges in the 2006 Progress Report on Moldova‟s 
implementation of the Action Plan that steps has been taken, including: national anti 
corruption strategy, national program  on actions on migration and asylum, and legislation on 
trafficking and money laundering (Sasse: 2010: 199). Furthermore, it has ratified the 
European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrants, Council of Europe Convention on 
Trafficking of Human Beings, and wrote off death penalty from its constitution (Ibid.).   
In the 2007 Progress Report EC recognizes that Moldova made progress in trade related 
issues and were granted autonomous trade preferences as well as certification of origin of 
goods, entree into force of visa facilitation and readmission agreements (Ibid.). Moldova 
made more moderate progress on issues more directly related to the 5+4 norms: local 
government, judicial reform, anti-discrimination and trafficking (Ibid.). 
Niemann and de Wekker identify democratic reform and good governance as areas of which 
Moldova has made progress on reform implementations. Concretely in the areas of free and 
fair elections, freedom of expression, judicial reforms, transparency of government, and anti 
corruption legislation and campaigns (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 24) a whole range of 
policy initiatives have been successfully implemented. These political institutional norm 
adaptions can be directly related to the favorable Moldovan moods towards EU (Ibid.). This 
means that the country chooses to follow a reform process in line with NPE.  
Thus far it has been shown that there have been considerable changes of the norms in 
Moldova in alignment with the norms of the Union though the degree of implementation has 
been modest. This means that the Union through NPE has indeed been effectual in its impact 
through ENP in Moldova. While the impact of ENP in Moldova has now been assessed it is 
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also possible to conclude that ENP is in an initial stage in Moldova. The government has good 
intentions on European integration but has only made moderate steps. Merely, it has set up 
institutions and laws. Thus, while the intentions are in place the capabilities to implement are 
lacking. This should, though, be seen in the light of the fact that institutions are sticky and 
central political institutions takes time to change. 
 
 6.2.9 ENP Impact in Ukraine 
Ukraine is an important ENP country with much political attention attached. The Action Plan 
of 2005-2008 laid out a whole range of broad focus points in most of the areas of the 5+4 
norms. These have though been somewhat influenced by the changing and unstable political 
climate in Ukraine, with shifting governments of Yulia Tymoshenko, Viktor Yushenko and 
Viktor Yanukovych in power. This has been combined with a rivalry between the president 
and the government, and dysfunctional relations of the government vis-à-vis the parliament 
(Sasse: 2010: 189). 
In spite of the unstable political climate progress has occurred. The particular issues of impact 
are energy cooperation, visa facilitation, market economy and border issues (Sasse: 2010: 
184-185). Furthermore Ukraine has been recognizing that only continuing successful 
implementation steps will bring them closer to EU membership and it is a broad consensus in 
their foreign policy that closer relation with EU is preferred (Sasse: 2010: 188). Therefore the 
trajectory of Ukraine seems to be bound to European integration and consequently possible 
membership talks.  
Considerable progress has furthermore been made in a wide range of issues: cooperation 
between Ukraine and Moldova in the Transnistria issue and a border assistance mission, 
market economy, judicial reform, fight against corruption, energy cooperation (Sasse: 2010: 
191). The EC recognized in the 2007 progress report that there was positive impact in terms 
of WTO membership, visa facilitation, exchange of costumes information, more effective 
combat of illegal cross-border activities (Ibid). Further Ukraine has developed its democratic 
conduct of elections and increased media freedom (Ibid.).  
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Though these progresses are made the Union finds room for improvement: “Nonetheless, we 
are concerned at consistent and wide-spread reports of deterioration in respect for 
fundamental freedoms and democratic principles in Ukraine. Particularly worrying are 
complaints related to freedom of the media, freedom of assembly and freedom of association. 
Respect of these fundamental values is essential.”( Consilium.europa.eu 2010 ) The HR 
makes this statement before a crucial EU-Ukraine summit and while negotiations on EU-
Ukraine association agreement is under way, and therefore puts pressure on the Ukrainian 
delegation to take steps to agree to implement these policy initiatives in the agreement, even 
though progress has been made.  
Another considerable norm change in Ukraine by NPE is the fact that European integration 
since 2005 have been part of the domestic policy area as opposed to the prior situation where 
it was excluded to the foreign policy domain (Lupu: 2010: 13). Furthermore, the recent 
election of Viktor Yanukovych as president brought in the policy of “key priority, European 
integration,” for involving foreign policy and internal reform strategy in equal measure” 
(Ibid.). This is a considerable norm change first and foremost in the discourse of the political 
elite in Ukraine. 
The NGO of the Razumkov Centre found that for the Action Plan 224 out of 227 government 
actions were in accordance with the ENP goals, and 78 percent fully or partly implemented 
while 22 percent was not implemented (Sasse: 2010: 192). Therefore it can be concluded that 
there has been considerable impact of Normative Power Europe through ENP in Ukraine. The 
norms have thus been changes towards the EU norm set generally as well as concretely in the 
policy initiatives. 
  
 6.4 Genuineness of Normative Intent, Process and Impact 
In chapter 3.3 the normative congruity of NPE was elaborated in Intent, Process and Impact. 
The NPE framework will in this chapter be applied in analysing the norm consistency of the 
ENP cases and therefore its legitimacy. The former empirical analysis will be elaborated in 
Intent, Process, and Impact, in order to answer to what extent the ENP is normatively 
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consistent. Thus it is investigated to what degree the Union through ENP succeeds in norm 
change. Furthermore the genuineness of the norms projected is analysed. The countries are 
here analysed as a whole thereby generally assessing the legitimacy and consistency, and 
thereby nature of the ENP. 
 
 6.4.1 Normative Consistency 
When considering norm consistency, the EU is very conscious about the electoral process in 
Moldova but it seems there are inconsistencies when it comes to Member States.  First of all, 
the democratic deficit of EU parliamentary elections is a well-known democratic deficiency 
and subject to continuous debates. The set up of the European Parliament electoral system is 
not representative of the opinion of EU citizens. As for elections in Greece, the 
OSCE/ODIHR EAM found cases of distribution of pre-marked ballots to supporters by 
several parties in 2009.  Apart from emphasising the need of more inclusion of Greek citizens 
abroad, the OSCE/ODIHR EAM highlighted the necessity of establishment of provisions for 
access for internal non-partisan and international observers to all levels of electoral processes 
(OSCE 2009). The 2010 Hungarian elections were not perfectly democratic either. The 
Constitutional Court ruled that there was a lack of national minorities represented and a lack 
of provisions providing a continual review of certain electoral districts and their boundaries, 
which undermined voting equality. This ruling has not yet been implemented (OSCE 2010).  
These issues reflect inconsistency and duality in the case of elections handled by the EU, 
although most elections in recent years according to the OSCE were mostly positive and 
democratic in their outcomes. 
In the case of human rights and fundamental freedoms, there is some inconsistency in terms 
of the upholding of human rights in the EU itself. In 2009, The Human Rights Watch 
continuously monitored the EU Member States and several countries have been alleged in 
breaching human rights.  The countries on the list included Italy, France, Greece, and the UK.  
The Italian and French discrimination towards Roma minorities were highly criticized 
(hrw.org 2010). Thus, overall there are measurable inconsistencies between the upholding of 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms in the EU itself, which is a concern when the EU 
must be accepted as a credible actor. 
Establishing peace and conflict resolution within the European Union has been on different 
levels. In the case of ETA separatist aggression and the Basque population in Spain, there has 
been a long history of conflictual relations. Recently, several MEPs, including Frieda 
Brepoels - member of the European Parliament's Basque Friendship Group, called for and 
stressed the importance of more involvement on behalf of the EU in the process of conflict 
resolution, referring to the EU‟s decisive role in supporting the peace process in Ireland 
(friedabrepoels.eu 2010). The EU has been partially successful in its norm consistency in 
peace and conflict resolution, as it has provided a concrete action plan called the EU 
Programme for Peace and Reconciliation, with three stages PEACE I, PEACE II, and PEACE 
III Extension for Northern Ireland and the six Border Counties of Ireland (European 
Parliament 1999). As the EU mostly relies on soft power measures it can be stated, that 
conflict resolution is a rather sluggish process, even within the EU itself.  
 
 6.4.2 Normative Coherence  
As noted by Niemann and de Wekker (2010) and Smith (2005) “it has been argued that 
inconsistency in the treatment of ENP partner countries may reduce the EU‟s credibility and 
legitimacy” (Smith 2005) and that “if inconsistencies in a policy – for instance when 
characterised through the use of double standards – cannot be justified on the basis of a valid 
principle, the policy in question is incoherent” (Niemann and de Wekker 2010). 
In the case of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, human rights, and 
fundamental freedoms, it seems that there are inconsistencies between what is applied within 
the EU and what is promoted in Ukraine and Moldova. It is peculiar how the EU could 
request compliance and adherence to Action Plans when there are inconsistencies within the 
EU itself. Therefore it must be noted that the supranational level of the EU may be more 
focused on an idealistic image of the EU rather than the actual reality of policy application in 
Member States. 
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In the case of Moldova when compared to Ukraine, Niemann and de Wekker concluded that 
Ukraine has been given more attention than Moldova even though Moldova made more 
progress in implementing the Action Plans in 2008/09 (Niemann and de Wekker 2010: 17-18). 
This is explained by the underlying strategic importance as well as the gas supply between 
Russian and several European countries. Thus, double standards resulted in policy 
inconsistencies and the lack of normative consistency when comparing Moldova with Ukraine 
(Ibid.). This is an example of the possibility of EU‟s security concern and its interest in 
securing gas supply though Ukraine. Interestingly, the website EurActiv.com titled Moldova 
as the most EU friendly country in 2010 and in Moldova “EU was assessed positively and 
was associated with economic prosperity and democracy” (EurActiv.com 2010), while 
Ukraine has been criticized for an ambiguous relationship between itself, the EU and Russia. 
From the 2010 Progress Reports it seems that in the case of media freedom, both Ukraine and 
Moldova are equally criticised by the EU for lacking a democratic foundation and interfered 
with law enforcement and state organs, thus lacking freedom of expression and pluralism. 
At the 2010 EU-Ukraine Summit, Ukraine has been criticised for a lack of connection 
between EU norms and giving “renewed impetus to reform efforts in particular as regards the 
consolidation of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law” (EU-Ukraine 
Summit 2010) also in the light of flawed local elections.  Yet strong measures of 
conditionality have not been applied. It is possible, that the EU fears to alienate Ukraine and 
allow close association with Moscow. This represents a rather Neo-realist view of Ukraine as 
a bridge of security between the European Union and Russia.  
 
 6.4.3 Genuineness of Normative Intent 
Normative Intent of the ENP is a question of whether the norms EU is trying to promote acts 
as if they are pursued by a self-interested agenda, or can be described as genuine norms that 
can be broadly accepted, and identified as acting for good. Thus the reason for engaging with 
the partner countries should not be based purely on self interest in order to be legitimised. 
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Regarding the position of norms in the cooperation with the partner countries, whether centre 
or peripheral to the EU‟s engagement, we see that the norms indeed are central. This is the 
case because the Action Plans clearly state the intentions of norm change, and put these norms 
central to the cooperation. Thus it is not likely that the relation is based directly on self-
interest, and therefore has partly genuine normative intentions. 
Is the ENP applied consistently or are there double standards attached. In terms of consistency 
the matter is whether the same standards applied by the EU internally that it asks of partner 
countries. The question is whether or not there is consistency and whether declarations are 
followed up compared to other ENP partner countries are provided by actions. From the 
analysis of the case countries we have already found that for both Moldova and Ukraine the 
focus of the ENP is centred on EU norms and values. And in both countries there is 
conditionality of reforms based on EU values exchange of better trade and border agreements 
with the EU. Ergo, there is a coherency of intent and overall framework and rules of the ENP 
especially in terms of conditional internal market access: reforms for trade. On the other hand, 
when it comes to whether the EU applies the same standards internally as it does in Ukraine 
and Moldova, it can be concluded that in the area of democratic governance and electoral 
processes, there are inconsistencies in member countries. In addition, there are not only 
inconsistencies in Member States; the EU suffers from a democratic deficit in the EP 
elections. In the case of human rights and fundamental freedoms, several cases in Greece, 
Italy, the UK, France and Denmark, have become a topic of discussion on the Human Rights 
Watch. This exemplifies an inconsistency in the extent to which the EU applies the same 
standards internally, though the breach of human rights in the Member States are not 
characterising the general situation. 
From the National Indicators we also know that it is roughly the same prioritization of 
negotiation in both countries, with an added emphasis on fundamental freedoms in Moldova, 
i.e. rule of law and good governance as the most important overall areas. It should also be 
noted that although the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova is not articulated as a most 
important area in the ENP agreements, the conflict is mentioned as a high priority area in the 
Moldova Action Plan. In Ukraine the cooperation has taken a step further and trade 
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harmonisations have become a secondary negotiation issue, with energy supply as a stated 
tertiary concern. Although there is not an identical statement of priorities in Moldova and 
Ukraine it reflects local priorities rather than showing an inconsistency of EU policy. 
 
 6.4.4 Genuineness of Normative Process 
The Normative Process of the EU needs, in order to act in accordance with Normative Power 
Europe, to be open towards external input, general criticism and also reflect upon the impact 
of its actions. Moreover norms have to be normatively justifiable, as the scope of them needs 
to embrace a larger consensus than the Union. Thus the norms need to be universally 
acknowledged. This can be justified because we see that the norms are directly or indirectly 
acknowledged in the international political system, e.g. the United Nations, OSCE and 
Council of Europe. 
Going back to the overall framework of the ENP then there is an inconsistency in the process 
of the ENP in duality of human rights promotion. Also in reforms for trade where Moldova 
has a better level of cooperation with the EU than Ukraine, it is Ukraine that gain best access 
to the EU. One explanation for this is that the EU needs to secure its dependence on Ukrainian 
gas pipes, and must therefore be careful not to make too stern demands of Ukraine. In regards 
to the Transnistrian conflict it should be mentioned that the EU wish to make a Transnistrian-
Moldovan reconciliation a better option for Transnistria by supporting a stronger institutional 
setting in Moldova and stabilise the political and public area.  
 
 6.4.5 Genuineness of Normative Impact 
Normative change towards the EU norms has been taken to a considerable extent in both 
Moldova and Ukraine. The norms have become a part of the discourse, and it can therefore be 
acknowledged as norm adaptation. This can be seen in the fact that both case countries have 
declared EU membership a strategic goal and therefore pursuing norm change via the ENP 
towards reaching that goal. 
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The impact of the ENP implementation in both Moldova and Ukraine is generally that both 
countries has started reforms that support EU values and standards within the areas of 
corruption, economic infrastructure and institutions that build confidence in the public 
administration. Therefore the Union through ENP does indeed have a direct impact changing 
Moldova‟s and Ukraine‟s political institutions and discourses towards EU norms.  
Moreover, though, it appears that the weight of Ukrainian energy supply in ENP negotiations 
on reforms for trade, is not proportional to the normative importance of energy security. In 
Moldova the most important aspect of the ENP is a Transnistrian solution, thus the ENP is 
tested as a tool of conflict management which is not just consistent with the ENP as a 
normative tool but also proving, if a successful reconciliation in Transnistria is achieved, that 
the EU norms embedded in the ENP can be used for conflict management. 
Both countries have implemented EU policy as a central ministerial part of their political 
apparatus and also its political discourse. Concretely, the general policy impact has been in 
the areas of the 5+4 norms i.e. peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights, and social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good 
governance. For Moldova the impact has been within: NGO development securing the aspect 
of good governance, a national anti corruption strategy, national program on actions on 
migration and asylum, and legislation on trafficking and money laundering, ratification of the 
European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrants, Council of Europe Convention on 
Trafficking of Human Beings, wrote of death penalty from its constitution, trade related 
issues, entre into force of visa facilitation, local government, judicial reform, anti-
discrimination and anti-trafficking measures. For Ukraine policy impact has been within: 
energy cooperation, visa facilitation, market economy (WTO membership), border issues, 
Transnistria issue, market economy, judicial reform, fight against corruption, energy 
cooperation, visa facilitation, exchange of costumes information, democratic conduct of 
elections and increased media freedom. We acknowledge that these are related to our 
normative power framework of the 5+4 norms. Thus, it means that the 5+4 norms related 
issues are central to and focal points in the ENP cooperation. This again means that for the 
most part there is consistency between the intentions and impact of the ENP. Therefore chiefly 
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the actions of the ENP can be concluded to be genuine. It is though not entirely free of an 
internal-interest bias as concluded in the part about process consistency. In short there is 
coherency and consistency in the intent and framework of the ENP towards Moldova and 
Ukraine with room for local priorities, while the processes suggest some tendency to 
prioritisation of energy security over conflict management. The ENP has achieved reforms 
adhering to EU norms in both countries while the ENP is used as a bargaining chip in 
negotiations on security of energy supply in Ukraine and conflict management in Transnistria. 
It is generally concluded that the impact of the ENP in the case countries does not benefit EU 
directly in the short term. Instead the benefit is more indirectly in the medium to long term. 
This implies that the EU does not have internal justifications of ENP. Therefore, chiefly the 
actions of the ENP can be concluded to be genuine in parallel with the developed Normative 
Power Europe framework. 
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7. Other Theoretical Explanations for ENP 
 
One of the main challenges of Normative Power Europe is whether normative actions can be 
explained by other International Relation theories. We would like to address this approach by 
applying respectively a neo-realist and a neo-liberal explanation to the external actions of the 
EU. The neo-realist approach will focus on if normative inconsistencies are justified by power 
relations, while the neo-liberal approach will focus on economic interdependence as a way to 
obtain stability and peace. 
The interrelationship through the ENP between the EU and Moldova is based on the areas of 
immigration, poverty and crime, minority protection and human rights, development of 
democratic institutions, the fight against corruption and the Transnistrian conflict. 
The most obvious neo-realist explanation for the EU to engage itself so heavily in the internal 
workings of Moldova would be the security issue that arises when looking at the Transnistian 
conflict, and the fact that Russian troops is based in the region. The overall concern from the 
EU, when facing the problem, is that the current Moldovan institutions cannot compete with 
Russian influence in the region. Hence it will from a neo-realist perspective be in the interest 
of the EU to develop stronger democratic institutions in Moldova, which could act as a 
counterweight to Russian influence. However, the policy tools provided by the ENP, when 
looking at the strengthening of the Moldovan institutions can from a neo-realistic view be 
considered as insufficient because of the soft power approach; insufficient to solve the 
conflict, and thus weak as a general foreign policy instrument. NPE does nevertheless 
acknowledge this critique, and argues that stability building is best achieved through long and 
extensive negotiations instead of a quick conflictual hard power approach. This could again 
be seen as a problem from a neo-realistic point of view, considering the fact that long and 
extensive negotiations does not remove the security thread Russian troops in create as long as 
negotiations still is in process, hence still is a threatening the stability in the region. Neo-
realists would point to the lack of EU military capabilities as being the centre of the problem. 
If the EU could combine its economical strength to a stronger military force, it would also be 
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in a better position to outweigh Russian influence in the region, and pursue a more effective 
hard power approach to the conflict. This would not only end the conflict and stabilize the 
region, but also place the EU in a better position in the system, thus also helping it in other 
current and future conflicts with Russia. However, by emphasizing its military capabilities the 
EU also risks of putting itself in a situation where the regional balance of power is moving 
heavily to the advantage of the EU. This will create a situation where the much weaker states 
in the region will try to out-balance the power of the EU instead of band-wagoning with it.      
The interrelationship through the ENP between the EU and Ukraine is based on protection of 
gas deliveries, the political stability of Ukraine, human rights and the Four Freedoms. Despite 
the EU acknowledging that Ukraine is further behind than Moldova with regards to living up 
to EU values, Ukraine has already gained periodic visa free travel into the Union as well as a 
clear promise of free trade if the current line on reforms is kept. It can be seen as a reasonable 
neo-realist explanation that the EU want to stabilize an important part of its energy security, 
especially when seen in the light of previous unstable governments in Ukraine.  
It would also fit a neo-realist explanation that Ukraine has an easier time gaining EU benefits 
than Moldova based on the greater strategic importance Ukraine. However if Ukraine is so 
important to the Union it would be more feasible to give a promise of accession to determine 
the relationship between the EU and Ukraine.  
The more underlying intentions of the ENP can partly be explained by a neo-realist 
assumption. The overall incentive for the EU in starting the ENP process is based on internal 
security policy through the Security Strategy of the EU. On the other hand neo-realism will 
have problems in explaining the genuine and consistent normative Intent, Process and Impact. 
Furthermore the centrality of the 5+4 norms pursued by the ENP and the weight put on these 
must be considered as a weakness when trying to explain the ENP in the scope of neo-realism. 
Instead a neo-realistic approach to the ENP would be based more on internal beneficial 
norms. Collectively neo-realism can see the EU's interest in Eastern Europe as a strengthening 
of its own regional hegemonic power into the Russian sphere of interest. Although this 
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explanation seems quite consistent it does not explain why the EU put so much emphasis on 
the spread of EU values.  
The question with regards to neo-liberalism is whether stability and cooperation can be 
achieved through economic and political interdependence and how it is put into practice 
through the ENP and the EU relations to Moldova and Ukraine. Increased trade between the 
EU and Moldova or Ukraine are at the core of negotiations within the ENP. But if a neo-
liberal doctrine should be upheld then trade negotiations would be a means to an end and not 
as it is now a reward for reforms. In a neoliberal frame the conditional trade agreements 
would suggest that reconciliation is only wanted if there is a correspondence of values 
between the EU and the third country. Either way stability is either based on values making it 
a normative configuration, or reconciliation is achieved through shared norms with a strong 
economic incentive for normative based reforms. A Neo-liberal approach to expanding the 
ENP would emphasize economic integration based on the argument of interdependence, 
followed by political integration, and not vice versa as the actual ENP. 
In contrast to Neo-realism, Neo-liberalism does to some extent correspond well to the idea of 
Normative Power Europe. The overall incitement, although, is possible gains rather that the 
spread of „doing good‟ norms, which eliminates the importance of universal values by 
peaceful means of influence. Instead relations is build upon the notion that the strongest actor 
dominates the weaker, which will be a foreign policy approach that is difficult to defend given 
the intergovernmental fundament of the EU. In order to define a foreign policy approach, 
which all Member States can agree on, emphasise should be on creating a foreign policy, 
which is not only attractive to the Member States, but also the targeting states. Neo-liberal 
interdependence theory can therefore be seen as an efficient foreign policy approach, when it 
comes to overall possible gains for the EU, but the lack of ideational impact, which is 
represented in Normative Power Europe, would create problems when trying to legitimise the 
foreign policy within the EU itself. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
This project report has been investigating to what extent the EU‟s European Neighbourhood 
Policy has genuine normative Intent, Process and Impact in the former soviet space of 
Ukraine and Moldova.  
It can be concluded that the Normative Intent, Process and Impact of the EU is based upon 
five core norms: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and four minor norms: respect for 
human rights, and social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good 
governance.  
It can also be concluded that there is a rivalry between Russia and the EU both on the norms 
in foreign policy and in the actual policies. Russia view Moldova and Ukraine in particular as 
having strong ties to Russia and as central to Russia's relations in Eastern Europe. In addition 
Russia views the EU's normative actions as a political challenge to Russian sphere of interest.  
In the matter of genuine Normative Intent, -Process and -Impact, it can be concluded that 
there has been a clear Normative Intent from the EU with the ENP. However, there is an 
inconsistency between the internal affairs between some Member States of the EU, which 
have lower standards than the standards warranted of ENP partners, and can therefore not be 
called truly genuine, unless viewed as a desire for genuine Intent by the EU, that has proven 
difficult to implement in its own Member States. 
Likewise, it can be concluded that while the Process by which the EU is conducting its 
normative spread is focussed on political reforms in third countries that strengthen EU norms, 
it does not offer equal opportunities of trade access for all ENP partners. Furthermore, the 
ENP is primarily a one way communication, where the receiving country can only say yes or 
no, instead of a dialogue between the EU and the receiver country on equal terms. This means 
that the Normative Process of the ENP is not implemented in a genuine manner. The extent of 
Normative Intent of the ENP in Moldova and Ukraine can be interpreted as both consistent 
and inconsistent. In the case of Moldova, there is a great emphasis on the norms of democracy 
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and the rule of law in the priority areas of the National Indicative Programmes. In the case of 
the 2009 elections, there is consistency in intending to increase the level of democratic 
electoral processes and good governance in the form of political pluralism and remedies to 
anti-corruption. On the other hand, the intentions of the EU do reflect double standards when 
it comes to electoral processes in the EU Member States. Moreover, the EU parliamentary 
elections are also dubious because of the democratic deficit. The norms of human rights and 
fundamental freedom, the EU clearly demonstrates consistency in promoting these norms 
through the establishment of a yearly Human Rights Dialogue and the involvement of various 
bodies such the EU Political and Security Committee, the Council Working Party on Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, and the EU Directors-General for Political Affairs, as well as the 
European Court of Human Rights to co-operate with the Moldovan government. However, 
due to the observations made by the Human Rights' Watch on EU, there is inconsistency due 
to double standards in EU Member States, where for instance, in Greece and Italy, there are 
case of breech of human rights. In the case of the norms of peace and conflict resolution the 
EU sets out mild goals in Moldova, but always demonstrates Normative Intent in achieving 
the reconciliation of Moldova and Transnistria by initiating dialogue with third parties 
including Russia and Ukraine.  
Despite some inconsistencies in the genuineness of Intent and Process in ENP, it can be 
concluded that there is a genuine Normative Impact in both Ukraine and Moldova. Both 
countries has started a reform process and already implemented legislation in line with the 
ENP. For Moldova the impact has been within most striking in NGO development securing 
the aspect of good governance, Transnistria issue, national program on actions on migration 
and asylum, and legislation on trafficking and money laundering, ratification of human rights 
treaties, trade related issues, and entree into force of visa facilitation. For Ukraine policy 
impact has been within similar areas as: energy cooperation, visa facilitation, market 
economy, border issues, Transnistria issue, market economy, judicial reform, fight against 
corruption, energy cooperation, democratic conduct of elections and increased media 
freedom. We acknowledge that these are related to our normative power framework of the 
5+4 norms. For the most part there is consistency between the intentions and impact of the 
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ENP. Therefore chiefly the actions of the ENP can be concluded to be genuine and legitimate. 
In addition, Ukraine and Moldova has both expressed a desire to join the EU, meaning that 
they are ready to commit themselves to a closer relationship with the European Union. 
The enlargement brings in new countries and thereby moving the bordering regions further 
away from Brussels. This increases the need of flexibility in the ENP policy framework. The 
enlargement policy vis-à-vis the ENP can be seen in order to analyse the balancing between 
membership and association and what it means for the members engagement in ENP policies. 
Some countries have through a semi boycott of the ENP stressed that they want accession 
talks instead. This was the case with Ukraine; sending its head of delegation instead of the 
foreign minister, in order to stress a distance from other ENP countries and that it has 
ambitions of membership association. Thus, clarifying what it takes for the ENP countries to 
start membership negotiations will enhance their willingness to effectuate and implement 
ENP measures. Therefore the prospect of membership in the ENP policies would enhance the 
influence and effectiveness of this policy. 
Emphasis should on a continuation of the foreign policy approach of the ENP, which is not 
based on hard power, but leaning more towards soft power and subject to a framework that is 
appetising to all Member States and receiving countries. The foreign policy approach of the 
EU should therefore be more focused on convincing and attraction, considering its lack of 
abilities to use force or coercion. Such an approach could be for the EU to act normatively in 
international relations, given the nature of normative power to be distancing itself from force 
and coercion. What further dilute the arguments neo-realists puts forward when commenting 
of the EU‟s lack of military capabilities is that the fundament of the Union as an 
intergovernmental institution, does not allow such an approach in the current political 
environment. Therefore, in order for the EU to gain influence as a foreign policy actor, it has 
to focus on its comparative advantages; economical strength and Normative Power.  
According to Neo-liberalism, economic interdependence is the precondition to shared norms 
and in Neo-realism the question of convergent norms is minor to the pursuit of power. In 
addition a neo-realistic approach to the ENP would only be based on internal beneficial 
norms. A Neo-liberal approach to expanding the ENP would emphasize economic integration, 
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based on the argument of interdependence, followed by political integration, and not vice 
versa as in the actual ENP. The interpretation of both theoretical frames relies on a 
understanding of norms, values or cultural spread as a goal in itself on equal footing as 
security issues or reconciliation, leading to a position where the argumentation is only valid 
under those presumptions.  
Hence, it can be concluded that neither Neo-liberalism nor Neo-realism can offer a full 
explanation to why the ENP creates a precondition of normative convergence to increased 
economic and political cooperation. Thus, it is concluded that Normative Power Europe is a 
comprehensive explanation for EU external action through the ENP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
9. Quality Validation 
 
The following text is a general self-reflection and evaluation of this project and it 
contemplates upon the analytical arguments, the credibility of the empirical sources and weak 
points in the project. 
As explained in the methodical chapter there has to be a reflection on whether the analytical 
arguments and findings in the project are valid and would be possible to replicate by other 
scholars conducting the same analysis. The overall findings and their argumentation are 
presented in the following text box. 
Findings Argument 
There is a rivalry between Russia 
and the EU both on the norms in 
foreign policy and in the actual 
policies. 
Russia view world politics as a zero sum game, meaning 
that Russia loose power when EU gains it, and in addition 
Russia only recognize the EU as a collective of states, and 
not as a single actor. Russia view the EU as a harmful 
intrusion into Russia‟s own sovereign prerogatives, 
including relations with its neighbours. 
The ENP has normative Intent. In EU policy papers there is a clear normative formulation 
of the Intent of EU foreign policy and ENP. 
The ENP is partly inconsistent in 
its normative Process. 
There is double standards in reforms for open trade 
agreement  in the ENP. Ukraine has been given a 
preferential deal despite being benchmarked less adhering 
to EU norms than Moldova.  
The ENP has normative Impact. Both Ukraine and Moldova has started a reform process 
reflecting EU standards and norms. 
The ENP cannot be fully Neo-realism cannot explain the extreme focus on values, 
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explained by Neo-realism. and the conditionality of reforms for increased cooperation 
Neo-liberalism cannot explain 
the focus on justifiable norms 
within the ENP. 
Neo-liberalism is unable to explain the precondition of 
value coherency to economic interdependence in the 
promotion of reconciliation in Europe. 
  
We find that it is feasible to say that Russia is at odds with the ENP, based on the Russian 
view on foreign policy that cannot allow two hegemonic powers to influence the same sphere 
of interest.  
When reviewing the three arguments concerning how normative the ENP is, it is apparent that 
although it is safe to say that the EU base much of its foreign policy on norms, and that both 
Moldova and Ukraine are applying reforms adhering to the EU, it is uncertain if these reforms 
would have come naturally at some point, as they solve a range of internal problems in both 
countries. In addition we feel that although it is safe to say that the EU use normative 
argumentation for its foreign policy, it could also be viewed as west centric and an expression 
of a new European cultural imperialism.  
With regards to Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism the interpretation of both theoretical frames 
relies on an understanding of norms, values or cultural spread as a goal in itself on equal 
footing as security issues or reconciliation, leading to a position where the argumentation is 
only valid under those presumptions.  
All in all our arguments can be said to be coherent under the preconditions that the EU norms 
does not have to be universal, and that you recognise norms as a goal in foreign policy by 
itself. If the universality of the 5+4 norms is not taken for granted, then the conclusion of the 
EU as a genuine normative power cannot be made. 
A general weakness of the findings and conclusions of this project report is that it is based on 
secondary sources originating primarily from EU official sources and European scholars. This 
means that the project relies on the objectivity of the EU in a case where it has an interest in 
promoting its own capabilities. Furthermore, European scholars might have a narrative based 
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on a European school of thought, which limit their understanding of foreign opposition to 
European values. It is a weak point in this project that this project is not based on Ukranian 
and Moldovan scientific views, which implies that the findings and conclusions on political 
institutional Intent, Process and Impact of ENP in Ukraine and Moldova might be superficial 
and not lasting in the longer term. 
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 10. General Perspective 
 
This research focused on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Normative Power 
of Europe (NPE), as well as two case studies - Moldova and Ukraine. The research also takes 
Russia as an international actor into consideration, therefore the investigation could have 
taken Russia as a focus point and how it influences Moldova and Ukraine through the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Because the initial interest was normative power 
itself, and all states are said to have normative power with values that define their foreign 
policy, Russia could have been a compelling perspective and a contrast to the European Union 
(EU) that is said to explicitly apply normative power and because Russia‟s foreign policy is 
centred on traditional power ambitions to regain its position as an influential global actor. 
Another perspective of the project report could have taken a focus on a different region of the 
ENP, for example other countries targeted by the ENP, such as Libya and Belarus, that may 
give a different empirical basis and produce different conclusions regarding the normative 
power of the EU.  Libya especially, would provide a foundation for an intriguing analysis, as 
its political climate is considerably divergent and there are no immediate prospects or 
aspirations to joining the EU, which is the case in both Moldova and Ukraine. Moreover, 
applying a different theoretical framework to the ENP as a foreign policy instrument in terms 
of International Relations may also result in a different angle of the argument behind the EU 
intentions in its neighbourhood. This could be a kind of quality control of the theoretical 
application of NPE.  
The above mentioned approaches are interesting because executing the research itself could 
help to position the EU as a global actor. The EU is a sui generis entity, rather difficult to put 
in a box and define - and researching it is like „blind men attempting to describe an elephant‟. 
Dependent on which aspects of it one analyzes, there is rarely one concrete and conclusive 
remark.  Nevertheless, with several empirical approaches and analyses one may get closer to 
an overview of whether the EU does have normative power and to what extent, or if 
normative power is merely an encapsulation of other sources of power. The various empirical 
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approaches are also useful in attempting to position the EU as a global actor and what 
methods it utilizes to maintain or advance its position in the international system.  
While the impact of the ENP has been concluded in this project report, an area which is 
interesting and important to view in perspective is the sustainability of the ENP which has not 
been part of the scope of this project. The relatively large impact of the Union foreign policy 
towards Ukraine and Moldova must in perspective be viewed in the context, that these 
countries are relatively poor and might be willing to say anything in order to achieve funding 
of its political apparatus. When that is stressed, it must also be acknowledged that the norms 
of the Union are very expensive to build into, and to maintain in the political institutions of 
the country in question. Therefore the budgetary justification of the partner country itself to 
accept the norms of the Union is to some extent superficial, though the countries abilities to 
implement norm change in the longer term will give answer to this question.     
There is an additional perspective of the EU in the world. The EU has changed the traditional 
perception of understanding states in international relations. The way that the ENP functions 
bring in a new way for international actors to conduct foreign policy, and new maxims for 
how third countries respond to normative and value based pressure. If one considers how 
values and norms where exported by Europeans at the start of the 20
th
 century to their 
colonies, then there has been a radical shift. Instead of forcing other countries to accept 
European norms, there has arisen a desire for other countries to not only acquire European 
values, but also to prove their willingness to be subject to EU rule. In previous centuries the 
behaviour of the EU could be denoted as empire building and associated with aggressive 
takeovers and a central dominant authority, while today the EU has started a trend of regional 
governance where countries willingly give up sovereignty in exchange for stability, prosperity 
and the negative effects of globalisation. 
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